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This thesis is composed of three essays on the volunteers in economics.  
A natural field experiment is designed in the first study to explore the effects of 
external incentives on the behavior of people differentiated by their original 
dominant motivation (intrinsic/extrinsic). This paper suggests that people who are 
intrinsically motivated respond to a more controlling incentive with a faster 
decrease of intrinsic motivation and a slower increase of extrinsic motivation, 
resulting in a crowding-out effect. Our study also finds the opposite crowding-in 
effect for more extrinsically motivated people.  
The second study attempts to examine the specific motivation of college 
students to volunteer, based on the interpretation of volunteering as consumption 
and investment. Micro-level data, collected by the online survey from volunteers at 
the Shanghai World Expo 2010 in China and (non-)volunteers on the RenDa 
Economics Forum, one of the main social networking sites in China, provide strong 
support for the consumption motive. As far as the investment motive is concerned 
we find no clear statistical evidence for its validity. The volunteering activities do 
not play a significant role in determining the future income compared with other 
factors, such as SNCEE, gender, age, parental education, working location and the 
type of working organization. 
In the third study, we show that an inflow of immigrants reduces social capital 
in receiving communities. Since the 1960s, the U.S. has seen a large decrease in 
 vi  
 
social capital as well as a considerable inflow of immigrants. This increased 
heterogeneity in U.S. cities may have increased the cost of investing in social 
capital and thereby reduced such investment. By using survey data on volunteering 
(our proxy for social capital investment) for 2005–2011, we find that a 10% 
increase in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in a state reduces the 
probability of U.S.-born individuals volunteering by 4–6%. 
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A Natural Field Experiment on How Volunteers with Different Dominant 
Motivation Behave in a Timely Evaluation System 
 
1.1 Introduction 
People who show a strong interest in their work and deeply enjoy the involvement 
in what they do are driven by the "love" for their work. This ―love of labor‖ is 
called ―intrinsic motivation‖, which refers to the motivation coming from the 
interest in the engagement itself. On the contrary, if activities are stimulated by 
some external factors and the resulted satisfaction or pleasure is not from the 
activity per se, they are motivated extrinsically. The motivation has been 
distinguished into intrinsic and extrinsic types since Atkinson (1964).  
In numerous experiments, subjects exhibited altruistic or reciprocal behaviors. 
However, at times, external incentives such as monetary incentives have a perverse 
effect on pro-social behaviors, reducing total contributions supplied by agents. In 
psychology, this phenomenon is described as the corruption effect by Deci (1975) 
or the ―hidden costs of rewards‖ by Lepper and Greene (1978). Later, it is Frey 
(1997) introduced this ―contradictory‖ effect into economics, naming the 
―crowding-out‖ effect. The crowding-out effect is an unusual and important 
economic phenomenon, which goes against the most fundamental economic "law": 
the supply will increase with increasing monetary incentives. When the crowding-




out effect is strong enough, a small amount of rewards will lead to a decrease in the 
volunteer supply. A number of researchers have studied this effect in different 
settings and through different interventions (e.g. Deci, 1971; Lepper and Greene, 
1978; Frey, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Mellström and Johannesson, 2008; and 
Charness and Gneezy, 2009). Monetary incentives lower the performance when it is 
an originally unpaid task (Heyman and Ariely, 2004; Ariely, Bracha, and Meier, 
2009; and Leuven, Oosterbeek, and Klaauw, 2010). Additionally, the crowding-out 
effect has also been found in blood and charitable donations when monetary 
incentives are present (Meier, 2007; and Mellström and Johannesson, 2008). 
However, the crowding out effect might not always be prevalent. Some studies (e.g., 
Frey and Jegen, 2001; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b) also offer empirical 
evidences of the crowding-in effect (describing external incentives can, in some 
cases, strengthen pro-social behavior).  
In general, two perspectives are studied regarding the effect of external 
incentives on people’s behavior. One of them focused on the type of external 
incentives, e.g., monetary and non-monetary incentives. Although a number of 
researchers gave priority to the monetary rewards for external incentives, a few 
studies also showed that some non-monetary incentives such as competition (Reeve 
and Deci, 1996), deadlines (Amabile, DeJong, and Lepper, 1976), limits (Koestner, 
Ryan, Bernieri, and Holt, 1984), fines (Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt, 2007; and Gneezy 
and Rustichini, 2000a), competitive tenders (Reeson and Tisdell, 2010) and 




restrictions of the choice set (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006) can change an individual’s 
intrinsic motivation for the activity per se. The other perspective lies in the types of 
activities (e.g., Osterloh and Frey, 2000; and Lazear, 1999). As found by Lazear 
(1999), monotonous and simple tasks are motivated extrinsically; while stronger 
intrinsic motivation is required when the activities are complex and knowledge-
intensive (Osterloh and Frey, 2000).  
However, this paper argues that people with different dominant motivations 
perceive the same external incentive differently, further leading to different 
behaviors. The aim of this study is to examine how external incentives affect the 
behavior of people motivated differently (extrinsically or intrinsically). To test this 
argument, volunteers in CHINAOPEN 2011, one of the top tennis tournaments, are 
distinguished into two types according to their original dominant motivation: the 
intrinsic type if the original intrinsic motivation is stronger than the extrinsic one, 
and the extrinsic type otherwise. A natural field experiment is designed to explore 
the behavior of people with different motivation types (intrinsic or extrinsic) 
through an evaluation system, a type of non-monetary incentives.  
Based on the natural field experiment, we suggest that the total effect observed 
consists of two unobserved effects: the crowding-out effect and the crowding-in 
effect. Also, individuals motivated predominantly intrinsically show less 
commitment when they perceive an external incentive as more controlling, whereas 
individuals motivated predominantly extrinsically increase their effort when they 




perceive an external incentive as  more controlling.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 reviews the literature 
on incentives and efforts, followed by two hypotheses. Section 1.3 introduces the 
design of the experiment. The empirical estimations, results and some discussions 
are presented in Section 1.4. Finally, conclusive remarks will be given in Section 
1.5. 
 
1.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
People, in classical economics, are assumed to be ―homo economicus‖ (Frey, 1999), 
that is, they are stimulated extrinsically and their reactions to external incentives 
can be predicted. This process is consistent with the stimulus-response theory 
stating that changes in people’s behavior are always attributed to the changes in 
restrictions instead of their preferences (Stigler and Becker, 1977). Similarly, 
external incentives can be implemented to affect people’s behavior directly 
(Thorndike, 1927).  
However, some contradictions of this traditional approach have been found and 
discussed in recent years, which also opens the era of modern psychological or 
behavioral economics. The behavioral economics combines the evidence in both 
psychology and economics, and attempts to find out empirical foundations for the 
assumptions on human behavior (Barkema, 1995; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Frey and 
Jegen, 2001; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b; and 




Osterloh and Frey, 2000). 
The behavioral economics differs from the classical economics mainly in two 
aspects, which are relevant to our discussion. The first one is that people are 
motivated both extrinsically and intrinsically, and these two types of motivation 
work non-additively. Secondly, people react to external incentives in a cognitive 
way, i.e., in accordance with their feelings.   
 
1.2.1 Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation  
In opposition to the classical economics, there is a correlation between extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation. Putting it differently, the presence of one motivation changes 
the other. Many studies including laboratory and field experiments in psychology 
(Deci, 1971; Deci, 1975; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan, 1999; and Lepper, Greene, and 
Nisbett, 1973) and behavioral economics (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) provide 
evidences for this correlation. The crowding-out effect, as reported by 
Csikszentmihalyi (1975), can be found in activities motivated by enjoyment-based 
factors intrinsically, such as a game or a challenging task without any rewards 
(Shapira, 1976; and Deci and Ryan, 1985). Moreover, those activities motivated 
through obligation-based factors intrinsically can also induce the crowding-out 
effect (Frey, 1997; and Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger, 1996). For 
example, most activities in working environment are always obligation-based 
motivated, because people act in a certain way for the need to ―act appropriately‖ in 




their social context (see Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Frey, 1997; Akerlof and Kranton, 
2000; Tyler and Blader, 2000; and Lindenberg 2001). 
 
1.2.2 Incentive, Cognition and Motivation  
Behavioral economists attempt to explain the crowding-out effect by psychological 
theories in an economic approach, such as: the looking-glass self-theory (Benabou 
and Tirole, 2003) and the framing theory (Lindenberg, 2001). In addition, self-
perception processes in the attribution theory have been introduced to explain the 
fall of intrinsic motivation caused by some forms of monetary incentives (Bem, 
1972; and Ferrin and Dirks, 2003). In particular, the self-determination theory 
(SDT), which provides a more comprehensive explanation than other theories, has 
gained wide support by empirical studies (Deci and Ryan, 1985; and Deci, Connell, 
and Ryan, 1989), and will be discussed in further details as follows. 
The concept ―locus of causality‖, proposed by De Charms (1968), explains the 
reason and conditions that external incentives need to shift the motivation from an 
intrinsic one to an extrinsic one. The locus of causality is ―a belief about whether 
the outcomes of our actions are contingent on what we do (internal causality) or on 
events outside our personal control (external causality)‖ (Zimbardo, 1985).  
The self-determination theory (SDT) provides comprehensive analyses of the 
reason and direction the locus of causality moves (Deci and Ryan, 2000; and Gagné 
and Deci, 2005). According to Deci (1976), people desire the feeling of competence 




and self-actualization (named as self-determination in later studies). In details, Deci 
(1976) summarizes that being intrinsically motivated involves doing an activity not 
because it will lead to an extrinsic reward but rather because it fosters the 
individual’s internal feelings of competence and self-actualization. Therefore, any 
external incentive that feeds these feelings has potential to affect his intrinsic 
motivation. This means, then, that external incentive can have at least two aspects. 
One is a ―controlling‖ aspect, which makes the individual dependent on the external 
incentive; the other is an ―informational‖ aspect, which affects his feelings of 
competence and self-actualization. For example, for the external incentives, such as 
money and threats, the controlling aspect is quite prominent in a person’s mind 
because money and threats are commonly perceived as controllers of behavior. As a 
result, subjects become dependent on these controls and lose intrinsic motivation 
even though earning money or avoiding punishment could provide them with 
positive information about their competence and self-actualization.  
Therefore, the stronger feeling of self-determination by external incentives, the 
stronger an internal locus of causality will be. In other words, the behavior will 
mainly be the result of an external locus of causality if the controlling aspect of 
external incentives is prominent in a person’s mind.  
As aforementioned, the locus of causality could be shifted by external 
incentives, which are actually cognized and interpreted by people. This shift will 
affect the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in oppose directions at the same time. In 




fact, most activities are undertaken by both locus of causality, i.e., the interest and 
external pressure. No matter whether the external incentives are perceived to 
strengthen or weaken the feeling of self-determination, an unobservable crowding-
out effect as well as an unobservable crowding-in effect occur simultaneously, 
leading to an observable total effect on the behavior. However, the relative strength 
of these two effects depends on the perception or interpretation of external 
incentives.  
As shown by Deci and Flaste (1996), Zuckerman, Porac, Lathin, and Deci 
(1978), and Deci and Ryan (2000), the external incentives such as the chance to 
make a decision and set a goal, more choices in the task engagement, or the receipt 
of constructive feedbacks tend to enhance the feeling of self-determination. On the 
other hand, Gagné and Deci (2005) summarized that the external incentives, such as 
tangible rewards, deadlines (Amabile, DeJong, and Lepper, 1976), surveillance 
(Lepper and Greene, 1975), and evaluations (Smith, 1975), strengthen the feeling of 
controlling (weaken the feeling of self-determination), leading to the change from 
an internal to an external locus of causality (De Charms, 1968; and Heider, 1958). 
 
1.2.3 Hypotheses 
This paper proposes that the perception of the same external incentive could vary if 
the predominant motivation of people differs, since an individual driven 
predominantly extrinsically is more likely to be affected by the external locus of 




causality. That is, this kind of individuals believes that their behavior is guided by 
the fate, luck or other external circumstances. On the contrary, an individual driven 
predominantly intrinsically tends to be affected by the internal locus of causality. 
That is, the intrinsic type of individuals believes that their behavior is guided by 
their personal decisions and efforts.  
Since the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation is non-additive, these two types of 
motivation will be changed simultaneously by external incentives. In line with Frey 
(1997), the intrinsic motivation is likely to be lowered when people perceive 
external incentives as controlling, while the extrinsic motivation sees an increase; in 
contrast, an external incentive felt as self-determination tends to enhance the 
intrinsic motivation and weaken the extrinsic motivation. The following hypotheses 
arise from these discussions: 
 
Hypothesis 1.1: For an individual motivated predominantly intrinsically, a more 
(less) controlling external incentive
1
 sees a faster decrease (increase) of the 
intrinsic motivation than an increase (decrease) of the extrinsic motivation, thus an 
observable crowding-out effect (crowding-in effect).  
 
Hypothesis 1.2: For an individual motivated predominantly extrinsically, a more 
(less) controlling external incentive sees a slower decrease (increase) of the 
                                                            
1 Despite a precise definition of ―controlling‖ incentive cannot be found in literature, but a number of literature 
(e.g., Deci, 1976; Deci and Ryan, 2000; and Gagné and Deci, 2005) use ―controlling‖ to describe those external 
incentives which are perceived as controllers of behaviors and will decrease the feeling of competence and self-
actualization. To keep a consistent description as literature, the ―controlling‖ is used in my hypotheses.  




intrinsic motivation than an increase (decrease) of the extrinsic motivation, thus an 
observable crowding-in effect (crowding-out effect). 
 
1.3 Experimental Design 
―Natural field experiments are those experiments completed in cases where the 
environment is such that the subjects naturally undertake these tasks and where the 
subjects do not know that they are participants in an experiment.‖ (List and Rasul, 
2011). Therefore, the subjects in a natural field experiment neither know that they 
are being randomized into treatment nor that their behavior is subsequently 
scrutinized. To test the hypotheses, volunteers in CHINAOPEN 2011 provided us 
an opportunity to adopt a natural field experiment, in which the intervention is 
novel and not subject to any potential shortcomings of the laboratory experiment. 
For example, as Levitt and List (2007a and 2007b) discussed, the fact that subjects 
are in an environment in which they are keenly aware that their behavior is being 
monitored, recorded, and subsequently scrutinized, might also cause 
generalizability to be compromised, which is a potential issue in a laboratory 
experiment but can be overcome when making inference from data generated by a 
natural field experiment. 
CHINAOPEN was launched in 2004, and is held in Beijing once a year 
regularly. It owns the right to host the tournaments of the three international tennis 
organizations (ATP, WTA and ITF), and it is the most comprehensive international 




tennis event with the highest level and the most players in Asia. The largest number 
of volunteers, 1555, was recruited in CHINAOPEN 2011. Among them 130 were 
team leaders who managed and evaluated the other volunteers, that is, one leader 
was in charge of 10 volunteers on average. The CHINAOPEN 2011 lasted for 16 
days, from September 25
th
 to October 10
th
 2011. On the basis of time, the 
experiment was divided into three stages: 
 
Stage 1: Pre-event Survey 
The pre-event survey has two aims: to collect the basic information of volunteers 
and measure their dominant motivation. The volunteers were surveyed (see the 





, 2011 when there was a mandatory training. Since the 
CHINAOPEN has the tradition of asking volunteers to do a self-report survey on 
the training days and they were not aware of our natural field experiment, this pre-
event survey can therefore be considered as part of their natural activities, in which 
we did not need to influence with a prize. From this survey, 1173 out of 1200 copies 
of questionnaires were collected back before September 20
th
, 2011. 
[Insert Form 1.1] 
To assess the motivation at the situational level in different contexts, Guay and 
colleagues have developed the Situational Motivation Scale (SIMS) (see Guay, 
Vallerand, and Blanchard (2000), for details of the development and preliminary 




validation of the inventory). This is an important step forward from a measurement 
perspective.  
The SIMS is a self-report inventory designed to measure the constructs of the 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in both laboratory and field settings. Taking into 
account that the scale must be short and versatile in order to capture the ongoing 
motivational regulations at the psychological state level, the SIMS measures both 
the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation constructs unidimensionally. 
The SIMS is not restricted to one context; it can be readily applied to any field 
and laboratory settings. Researchers (Brunel, Chantal, & Vallerand, 2000; Kowal & 
Fortier, 1999, 2000; Standage, Butki, & Treasure, 1999; Standage & Treasure, 2002) 
have used the SIMS to measure situational motivation in various activity settings. 
This research has shown that the SIMS exhibits adequate reliability and construct 
validity as reflected in the expected motivational type/consequential outcome 
relationship (Brunel et al., 2000; Kowal & Fortier, 1999; Standage et al., 1999).  
This paper borrows the Situational Motivation Scale (SIMS) proposed by Guay 
et al. (2000) to design question 25 in Form 1.1. Based on the SIMS, this study 
divided the motivations of volunteers into intrinsic motivators, influenced by the 
desire to increase another’s well-being, and extrinsic motivators, driven by the 
value or utility they receive as an external or investment benefit.  
Specifically, the participants have to indicate on a 1-7 scale why they choose to 
participate in the CHINAOPEN (Using the scale below, please mark under the 




number that best describes the reason why you choose to be a volunteer. Answering 
each item according to the following scale: 1: corresponds not at all; 2: 
corresponds very little; 3: corresponds a little; 4: corresponds moderately; 5: 
corresponds enough; 6: corresponds a lot; 7: corresponds exactly). Intrinsic 
motivation, related to the internal locus of causality, is measured with five items, for 
instance, ―I hope I can make a contribution to my country‖ and ―I have the 
awareness for voluntary service as I have been doing voluntary service‖. On the 
other hand, extrinsic motivation, related to the external locus of causality, is 
measured with thirteen items such as: ―It is a good beginning for me to find a job‖ 
and ―Volunteering has a positive effect on my jobs or study‖. One point needs to be 
clarified that the number of items to measure intrinsic motivation (five items) is 
smaller than that for extrinsic motivation (thirteen items), which is consistent with 
the original version in Guay et al. (2000). All the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
items
2
 are reported in Q25 of Form 1.1.  
Figure 1.1 presents the histograms of all 18 items, and we find the distribution 
of scores for each individual item to be right skewed. In a similar fashion to Guay et 
al. (2000), the average score of intrinsic and extrinsic items are calculated 
respectively and then compared. If the intrinsic score is higher, the volunteer is 
motivated predominantly intrinsically, and vice versa.  
[Insert Figure 1.1] 
                                                            
2 Intrinsic motivation: item 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9; extrinsic motivation: item 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
and 18. 




Psychological studies commonly use a version of self-report questionnaire to 
assess the motivation when an individual is motivated for a particular behavior 
(Ryan and Connell, 1989). This approach has been demonstrated as effective in 
many studies, for instance, Biddle, Seos, and Chatzisarantis (1999) and Grolnick, 
Ryan, and Deci (1991). But some authors have argued that there are biases inherent 
in using self-report questionnaire. In order to rule out the possibility that the self-
report questionnaire might not obtain a consistent response, a reliability test was 
conducted for the pre-event questionnaire.  
The retest method was used to test the reliability. There were 60 volunteers 
participating in the retest on September 23
rd
 2011, one week after the pre-event 
survey. The data from two surveys were compared to check the consistency rate, 
referring to the percent of volunteers who obtained consistent answers in the retest. 
Higher consistency rate indicates higher reliability. Table 1.1 shows the consistence 
rates from Q1 to Q23; most of them are above 90 percent and the lowest one is 85 
percent, indicating that these 23 questions are reliable. 
[Insert Table 1.1] 
The consistency rates of Q24 and Q25 are displayed separately, since these two 
are continuous questions, which means the volunteer is presented with a continuous 
scale (1 to 7). Table 1.2 and 1.3 present consistency rates of all options in Q24 and 
Q25; although they are not as high as other questions, the consistency rate is still 
above 75 percent. In particular, Q25 is designed to identify the dominant motivation 




of volunteers, so a new consistency rate is defined as below: consistent if the 
dominant motivation is same in two surveys, otherwise inconsistent. 96.7 percent 
(see the I/E column in Table 1.3) indicates the efficiency of Q25 to identify the 
dominant motivation. 
[Insert Table 1.2 and 1.3] 
Stage 2: Midterm Survey 
All volunteers will be evaluated on a standard scale of 1-7 (see the Form 1.2 
Evaluation Form for Leaders) by their own leader
3
 within September 25
th
 - October 
10
th
. The times of evaluations differ slightly according to the concrete positions, but 
most evaluations occurred around October 4th – 5th.  
[Insert Form 1.2] 
This study uses evaluation or surveillance as the external incentive to impact 
volunteers’ performance. Although monetary incentive is the most frequently used 
external incentive in literature, many other non-monetary incentives, as reviewed 
previously, have also been explored. 
The evaluation or surveillance strengthens the feeling of controlling (or weaken 
the feeling of self-determination). As the intensity of the surveillance increases, so 
does the feeling of controlling. This conclusion has been shown by several studies. 
For example, the presence of a video camera in Lepper and Greene (1975)’s 
experiment reduces the intrinsic motivation of children. A similar fall of the 
                                                            
3 Both the leader and normal volunteers did not know the natural field experiment, and they treated all the 
surveys as part of their natural duty in CHINAOPEN. The purpose of this experiment was only told to a few top 
managers in department of volunteer, CHINAOPEN 2011, and they have signed a secrecy agreement to keep 
this experiment from being leaked.  




intrinsic motivation for college students has been found by Plant and Ryan (2006). 
In addition, the surveillance by person can achieve the same effect as that by 
camera, reported by Pittman, Davey, Alafat, Wetherill, and Kramer (1980). In 
Harackiewicz, Manderlink, and Sansone (1984), participants who have information 
about the evaluation commit less than those without the information. Likely, if 
learning is aimed for test or examination, the learners’ intrinsic motivation sees a 
large decrease (Benware and Deci, 1984; and Maehr and Stallings, 1972). Our 
treatments are designed from these findings and in line with the degree of 
controlling. 
By One-way treatment, the volunteer will receive the Evaluation Form for 
Leaders from his/her own leader, that is, the volunteer will have the idea that he or 
she is under surveillance in the middle of the voluntary period. The Two-way 
treatment adds a self-assessment (see the Form 1.3 Self-Assessment Form for 
Volunteers) by the volunteer himself/herself one or two days before receiving the 
Form 1.2 Evaluation Form for Leaders from leaders. If the Self-Assessment Form 
includes the sentence ―the volunteer will receive the feedback from leaders in the 
future 1-2 days‖, it is defined as Full-disclosure treatment; in other words, the 
information about evaluation from leaders is timely. The last treatment Social-
information refers to the median score of all volunteers under one leader; if the 
evaluation form returned from the leader has Social-information, the volunteer 
knows not only his/her own, but also his/her peers’ performance in the group, 




resulting in a relative comparison. With the treatments from One-way to Social-
information, the leaders have added more external pressure on the volunteering 
environment, resulting in a more controlling external surrounding. There might be 
some concern on the information leaking across different treatment groups, which 
cannot be completely avoided due to the property of the natural field experiment but 
could be eased by the relatively scattered locations and different slots for volunteers 
during the CHINAOPEN 2011.  
Based on these treatments, the volunteers are randomly assigned to six groups 
(Table 1.4): group 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; and all leaders are in one group, namely the 
leader group. 
[Insert Table 1.4] 
 
Stage 3: Post-event Survey 
Due to the fixed ―working‖ hours in CHINAOPEN, these hours volunteered cannot 
be used to measure the efforts of volunteers. To cope with this difficulty, all 
volunteers were evaluated by their leaders one more time with the same Form 1.2 
Evaluation Form for Leaders at the end of CHINAOPEN 2011 (after October 10
th
, 
2011). This evaluation forms were not returned to volunteers no matter which group 
they were in. As a result, the ―difference‖ of two average evaluation scores (Post-
event and Midterm) from the same leader was adopted to measure the progress of 
the volunteering commitment.  




The leaders are not incentivized on their responses to this survey, because they 
were not told anything about this experiment, and all the evaluation duties looked 
―traditional‖ as the previous CHINAOPEN. There might be some concern on the 
possibility that their responses could be affected by social norms, personal 
relationships and social reference. This issue could be alleviated by the special 
training organized by the department of volunteer in CHINAOPEN 2011 for leaders 
on how to manage volunteers including the evaluation. In addition, the ―relative 
score‖ instead of ―absolute score‖ could mitigate the subjectivity caused by 
different leaders to some extent. Moreover, the dummy variable leader is also 
controlled for to reduce this bias from the perspective of econometrics. 
 
1.4 Results and Discussion  
We used Excel 2007 to input all the data from the three surveys (Pre-event, 
Midterm and Post-event), followed by striking out invalid observations defined as 
observations missing important answers (e.g. no answers for Q25) or filling in 
unreasonable answers (e.g. inconsistent with age and years of education). The 
remaining valid observations (939 in total) are encoded and analyzed by the STATA 
software. 
 
1.4.1 Statistical Description of Volunteers in CHINAOPEN 2011  
Table 1.5 summarizes the basic information of volunteers from the Pre-event survey. 




The first column uses the whole sample of volunteers, and the last two describe the 
intrinsic and extrinsic groups respectively. 
[Insert Table 1.5] 
The results show that most volunteers are undergraduates (around 96.27 percent) 
and the others have at least a specialist’s degree (ZhongZhuan), implying higher 
requirements are needed for volunteers in CHINAOPEN 2011 than that for simply 
being the service providers. Besides, most volunteers fall into the age interval of 21-
25, about 59.64 percent, and volunteers below 26 years old make up more than 99 
percent. Although the volunteers in our sample are very young, almost half of them 
have volunteering experience before. Most volunteers have monthly consumption 
below ￥2000 (approximately USD 314.3), because of the limited earning power of 
undergraduate students.  
The socio-economic factors in Table 1.5 might not be necessary to be included 
in the empirical regressions, owing to several reasons. First of all, a person’s 
motivation type could be related to these personal characteristic factors. As a result, 
controlling for these factors might remove some of the effects of the motivation 
type variable on the dependent variable, reducing the models’ power to test the 
hypotheses. Secondly, even though these factors could affect a volunteer’s efforts, 
their exclusion should not make a difference to the results because volunteers in 
CHINAOPEN 2011 have similar demographic background. Moreover, the analysis 
is based on the change of performance over the duration of the event while these 




factors are time-invariant. 
 
1.4.2 Empirical Estimation and Results 
We measured the crowding-out or crowding-in effect of external incentives by the 
change of volunteers’ performance. Concerning the original dominant motivation, 
the coefficient of the treatment dummy variable is interpreted as the effect of 
external incentives for the volunteers motivated predominantly extrinsically. The 
intersection of Intrinsic dummy and treatment dummy measures the difference 
between volunteers motivated predominantly intrinsically and extrinsically. 
The Ordered Logit regressions were used to test the effect of One-way timely 
evaluation on the volunteer work as below: 
2 1( | ) ( - )P Y Y X One way                                                                      (1.1) 
2 1 1 2 3( | ) ( - + - * )P Y Y X One way Intrinsic One way Intrinsic             (1.1’) 
The dependent variable is “Progress or not” of the voluntary performance 
measured by the difference of two average evaluation scores from Midterm (Y1) and 
Post-event (Y2). If Y2 - Y1 > 0, it is then defined as Progress; if Y2 - Y1 = 0, it is 
defined as Constant; otherwise Regress. The explanatory variable is a One-way 
dummy variable, 0 for the group 0 and 1 for the group 1. Regression (1.1) tests the 
effect of the timely evaluation for all volunteers, whereas equation (1.1’) 
distinguishes between the intrinsic and extrinsic dominant motivation. The Intrinsic 
dummy variable is equal to 1 for intrinsic volunteers, 0 for extrinsic ones. 




[Insert Table 1.6a and Table 1.6b] 
Results of econometric estimates are presented in Table 1.6a and 1.6b. More 
specifically, Table 1.6a focuses on the coefficients of Ordered Logit regressions 
while the marginal effects of corresponding coefficients are shown in Table 1.6b. In 
general, for CHINAOPEN 2011 with which this paper cooperated for this natural 
field experiment, One-way timely evaluation raises the intention of our participants 
to make additional commitments to volunteering, i.e. the crowding-in effect, 
particularly more significant for the extrinsic type than for the intrinsic one. The 
coefficient of One-way for the whole sample is 0.135 though not significant 
(column 1, Table 1.6a), implying its positive influence on the performance of 
volunteers. The estimation of the coefficient is robust with the control of leader 
dummy variables, reaching 0.299 (column 2, Table 1.6a). Furthermore, the 
corresponding marginal effect with the leader fixed effect for Progress, Constant 
and Regress are 0.033, -0.001 and -0.032 (columns 1 to 3, Table 1.6b), respectively, 
meaning 3.3 percent possibility for volunteers to contribute more after receiving the 
timely evaluation from their leaders. 
With distinction of the dominant motivation, extrinsic volunteers respond 
actively to this One-way timely evaluation, as shown by the significantly positive 
coefficients of One-way in the third (0.558*) and fourth (0.936*) columns (Table 
1.6a). The negative signs (-0.742* and -1.106 in Table 1.6a) of the intersection of 
variables Intrinsic and One-way suggest that intrinsic volunteers have an opposite 




reaction to this timely evaluation, even though the estimate is statistically 
insignificant with the leader fixed effect. The marginal effects in Table 1.6b reflect 
consistent results, i.e., 13.6 percent possibility for extrinsic volunteers to increase 
their effort, while intrinsic volunteers show an opposite inclination (-0.183*). In line 
with the hypotheses, the One-way evaluation, the least controlling treatment in our 
experiment, still results in a crowding-in effect for the extrinsic type of volunteer 
(Hypothesis 1.2), and a crowding-out effect for the intrinsic type (Hypothesis 1.1). 
With the increase of the controlling degree to the Two-way treatment, similarly 
Ordered Logit regressions are used to test its influence on volunteering:  
2 1( | ) ( - )P Y Y X Two way                                                                       (1.2) 
2 1 1 2 3( | ) ( - + - * )P Y Y X Two way Intrinsic Two way Intrinsic              (1.2’) 
The dependent variable is the same as before, but the explanatory variable is the 
Two-way dummy variable, 0 for the group 1 and 1 for the group 2. Regression (1.2) 
tests the effect of the Two-way timely evaluation for all volunteers, while (1.2’) tests 
the difference of effects between the two dominant motivation groups.  
[Insert Table 1.7a and Table 1.7b] 
Respectively, the coefficients and marginal effects of the Two-way treatment 
estimates are presented in Table 1.7a and 1.7b. The Two-way treatment, without 
distinction between the dominant motivation types, has no significant influence on 
volunteers conditioned on the One-way evaluation, as suggested by the coefficients 
in the first two columns (Table 1.7a). However, the positive response from the 




predominantly extrinsic volunteers (0.800**) corresponds to the prediction of 
crowding-in effect and provides a tentative confirmation of the Hypothesis 1.2. The 
volunteers predominantly intrinsically take a negative perception (-1.432***) on 
this more controlling Two-way evaluation, leading to a crowding-out effect, in line 
with the Hypothesis 1.1.   
To further test the robustness of our hypotheses, the Full-disclosure, Social-
information and Full&Social treatments are designed, on the condition of Two-way 
evaluation, to strengthen the controlling degree of the surrounding faced by 
volunteers. Ordered Logit regressions are put forward as follows: 
2 1( | ) ( )P Y Y X Full                                                                                 (1.3) 
2 1 1 2 3( | ) ( + + * )P Y Y X Full Intrinsic Full Intrinsic                                (1.3’) 
2 1( | ) ( )P Y Y X Social                                                                              (1.4) 
2 1 1 2 3( | ) ( + * )P Y Y X Social Intrinsic Social Intrinsic                          (1.4’) 
2 1( | ) ( * )P Y Y X Full Social                                                                    (1.5) 
2 1 1 2
3
( | ) ( * +
+ * * )




   
                                             (1.5’) 
where three explanatory variables are Full, Social and their intersection; the 
Full dummy variable is equals to 1 for group 3, and 0 for group 2; the Social 
dummy variable is 1 for group 4, and 0 for group 2; and the Full&Social dummy 
variable is equals to 1 for group 5, and 0 for group 2. Parallel to the previous 
equations, regression (1.3), (1.4) and (1.5) use the whole sample without difference 
between the two dominant motivations, while equation (1.3’), (1.4’) and (1.5’) test 




the difference of effects between the two dominant motivation groups. The 
estimates are shown in Table 1.8a, 1.9a and 1.10a (coefficients) and Table 1.8b, 1.9b 
and 1.10b (marginal effects). 
[Insert Table 1.8a to 1.10a and Table 1.8b to 1.10b] 
The results look similar to that of the Two-way treatment. The coefficients by 
using the whole sample in the first two columns (Table 1.8a to 1.10a) are mostly 
insignificant. Yet, if considering the dominant motivation, the crowding-in and 
crowding-out effects would be found for extrinsic and intrinsic volunteers, 
respectively. In detail, the positive coefficients of Full (0.778**), Social (0.724**) 
and Full&Social (0.573*) in the third column (Table 1.8a to Table 1.10a, 
respectively) show that more controlling external incentives have a strong positive 
effect on the predominantly extrinsic volunteers (Hypothesis 1.2), a consistent result 
with the control of leader dummy variables, 0.120* for Full, 0.627 for Social and 
0.583 for Full&Social (though it is only significant for the Full treatment at 10% 
level). The corresponding marginal effects (0.190**, 0.177** and 0.140*) shown in 
Table 1.8b to Table 1.10b imply that extrinsic volunteers have 19, 17.7 and 14 
percent possibility to enhance their performance under Full-disclosure or Social-
information or Full&Social treatments. Moreover, in agreement with the 
Hypothesis 1.1, intrinsic volunteers see a contrary trend, that is, coefficients of the 
intersection between Intrinsic and Full-disclosure or Social-information or Full& 
Social treatments are all negative with/without the leader dummy variables (though 




the estimate of the intersection between Intrinsic and Social-information is not 
significant when we control the leader fixed effect), and their negative marginal 
effects for Progress are -0.339***, -0.294*** and -0.213** (Table 1.8b to Table 
1.10b), thus showing the crowding-out effect.  
What is remarkable from these equations is that the influence of external 
incentives on people without distinction of the dominant motivation does not 
change consistently with the increase of the controlling degree. In contrast, people 
motivated predominantly extrinsically tend to put more effort in volunteering 
(crowding-in effect) when they meet more controlling external incentives; whereas 
a crowding-out effect occurs in people motivated predominantly intrinsically.  
 
1.5 Conclusion 
One of the advantages of working with CHINAOPEN 2011 is the use of 
randomized controls to identify the causal effect. Further, the key contribution of 
this paper is to test the influence of external incentives on the behavior of people 
motivated differently—predominantly intrinsically or extrinsically—by a natural 
field experiment, not at the expense of imposing an artificial environment. Our 
study suggests that people motivated predominantly intrinsically will respond to a 
more controlling incentive by a faster decrease of the intrinsic motivation and a 
slower increase of the extrinsic motivation, thus a crowding-out effect. Our study 
also finds the opposite crowding-in effect for people motivated predominantly 





Moreover, this study provides some implications for public policies towards 
volunteering. The non-monetary intervention, like the timely evaluation system in 
this experiment, is recommended to the volunteering management, due to its 
advantage of cost-saving over monetary rewards. However, the specific form or 
content of the intervention (it is evaluation in our paper) should be distinguished for 
intrinsic and extrinsic types of volunteers. Intrinsic volunteers would much prefer 
the "moderate" or "supportive" intervention with stronger self-determination, for 
example, asking for their suggestions or opinions about the voluntary management. 
Conversely, a more controlling surrounding or intervention would be better for 
extrinsic volunteers. 
Several important directions await future studies. Firstly, studies could examine 
the effect of monetary rewards on the behavior of people with different motivation 
types. Secondly, if the hours volunteered could be used to measure the performance, 
similar results would be more convincing. Thirdly, the relative homogeneity of our 
sample (age, nationality, and education) surely helps control the experimental 
setting. However, a study with more extensive sample could prevent our 
implications from being suitable only to a narrowly defined group of population.  
  




Table 1.1 The Consistency Rates from Q1 to Q23 
Question 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Consistent No.  60 60 52 60 60 60 60 58 
Inconsistent No. 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 2 
Consistency Rate 100.0% 100.0% 86.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 96.7% 
         
Question 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Consistent No. 60 56 60 60 60 52 51 52 
Inconsistent No. 0 4 0 0 0 8 9 8 
Consistency Rate 100.0% 93.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 86.7% 85.0% 86.7% 
         
Question 17 18 19 20 21 22 23  
Consistent No. 53 58 56 55 58 56 55  
Inconsistent No. 7 2 4 5 2 4 5  
Consistency Rate 88.3% 96.7% 93.3% 91.7% 96.7% 93.3% 91.7%  
 
 
Table 1.2 The Consistency Rates of Q24  
Option in Q24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Consistent No. 47 50 46 45 48 49 51 50 49 
Inconsistent No. 13 10 14 15 12 11 9 10 11 
Consistency Rate 78.3% 83.3% 76.7% 75.0% 80.0% 81.7% 85.0% 83.3% 81.7% 
 
 
Table 1.3 The Consistency Rates of Q25  
Option in Q25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Consistent No. 47 45 48 49 46 47 47 50 
Inconsistent No. 13 15 12 11 14 13 13 10 
Consistency Rate 78.3% 75.0% 80.0% 81.7% 76.7% 78.3% 78.3% 83.3% 
         
Option in Q25 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Consistent No. 48 51 47 46 51 50 48 49 
Inconsistent No. 12 9 13 14 9 10 12 11 
Consistency Rate 80.0% 85.0% 78.3% 76.7% 85.0% 83.3% 80.0% 81.7% 
         
Option in Q25 17 18 I/E      
Consistent No. 46 50 58      
Inconsistent No. 14 10 2      
Consistency Rate 76.7% 83.3% 96.7%      
Note: a) I/E refers to the intrinsically/extrinsically dominant motivation, and the consistency rate for I/E is 
defined as: consistent if the dominant motivation is same in two surveys, otherwise inconsistent.  
 
  




Table 1.4 The Treatment of Groups 
Treatment         
Group
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
One-way × √ √ √ √ √ 
Two-way × × √ √ √ √ 
Full-disclosure × × × √ × √ 
Social-information × × × × √ √ 







Table 1.5 Statistical Description of Volunteers in CHINAOPEN 2011 
  All (%) Intrinsic (%) Extrinsic (%) 
Gender Male 48.67 48.60 48.53 
Age 
16-20 39.83 36.98 42.24 
21-25 59.64 62.56 57.17 
26-30 0.53 0.47 0.59 
Educational Level 
Specialist’s Degree 0.21 0.23 0.20 
Junior college  2.66 3.49 1.96 
Bachelor 96.27 0.70 0.59 
Master 0.64 0.70 0.59 
Doctor 0.21 0.23 0.20 
Volunteer Experience Experienced 41.64 39.77 43.03 
Only Child Yes 82.75 81.40 83.69 
Annual  Household  
Income 
￥10,000 or less 7.67 6.98 8.25 
￥10,001- ￥50,000 41.00 38.37 43.22 
￥50,001- ￥100,000 32.27 33.72 31.04 
￥100,001-￥500,000 11.18 12.33 10.22 
￥500,001-￥1,000,000 3.09 3.02 3.14 
￥1,000,001or more 4.79 5.58 4.13 
Monthly Individual 
Consumption 
￥500 or less 6.82 7.21 6.48 
￥501-￥1000 51.33 48.60 53.63 
￥1001-￥1500 24.60 24.42 24.75 
￥1501-￥2000 10.44 12.33 8.84 
￥2001 -￥2500 1.38 1.63 1.18 
￥2501-￥3000 2.24 2.09 2.36 
￥3001 or more 3.19 3.72 2.75 
Note: a) Entries in the Table represent the proportion of each covariate for the whole sample (column 1), 
sample motivated predominantly intrinsically (column 2) and extrinsically (column 3). 
  





Table 1.6a Ordered Logit Estimates of One-way Treatment 
 All All (Leader Dummy) Type Type (Leader Dummy) 
One-way 
0.135 0.299 0.558* 0.936* 
(0.60) (0.90) (1.69) (1.72) 
Intrinsic 
  0.871*** 1.320*** 
  (2.71) (2.62) 
One-way & Intrinsic 
  -0.742* -1.106 
  (-1.65) (-1.54) 
Leader Dummies No Yes No Yes 
Number of Observations 315 315 315 315 
Log Likelihood -263.180 -190.789 -259.372 -187.149 
Prob>chi2 0.546 0.084 0.046 0.048 
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.276 0.015 0.289 
Note: a) Entries in the Table represent the coefficients from separate regressions of the relevant dependent 
variable. b) T-statistics are in parenthesis. c) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. d) The standard 










(△Y > 0) 
Constant 
(△Y = 0) 
Regress 
(△Y < 0) 
Progress 
(△Y > 0) 
Constant 
(△Y = 0) 
Regress 
(△Y < 0) 
One-way 
0.033 -0.001 -0.032 0.136* -0.005 -0.132* 
(0.60) (-0.59) (-0.60) (1.71) (-1.44) (-1.71) 
Intrinsic    
0.212*** -0.006* -0.206*** 
   
(2.78) (-1.90) (-2.76) 
One-way & Intrinsic    
-0.183* 0.003 0.180 
   
(-1.66) (1.49) (1.63) 
Note: a) Entries in the Table represent the marginal effects for the corresponding coefficients of dependent 
variables with leader fixed effect. b) T-statistics are in parenthesis. c) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 












Table 1.7a Ordered Logit Estimates of Two-way Treatment 
 All All (Leader Dummy) Type Type (Leader Dummy) 
Two-way  
-0.004 0.044 0.800** 1.144** 
（-0.02） （0.13） (2.33) (2.06) 
Intrinsic 
  0.862*** 1.187** 
  (2.68) (2.36) 
Two-way & Intrinsic 
  -1.432*** -1.792** 
  (-3.13) (-2.53) 
Leader Dummies No Yes No Yes 
Number of observations 312 312 312 312 
Log likelihood -257.942 -184.879 -252.727 -181.239 
Prob>chi2 0.984 0.041 0.015 0.021 
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.283 0.020 0.297 
Note: a) Entries in the Table represent the coefficients from separate regressions of the relevant dependent 
variable. b) T-statistics are in parenthesis. c) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. d) The standard 
errors are robust. e) Control and treatment groups for Two-way: group 1 and 2. 
 
 






(△Y > 0) 
Constant 
(△Y = 0) 
Regress 
(△Y < 0) 
Progress 
(△Y > 0) 
Constant 
(△Y = 0) 
Regress 
(△Y < 0) 
Two-way 
-0.001 0.00002 0.001 0.195** -0.004 -0.191** 
(-0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (2.40) (-1.60) (-2.39) 
Intrinsic    
0.211*** -0.004 -0.207*** 
   
(2.75) (-1.62) (-2.74) 
Two-way & Intrinsic    
-0.342*** -0.001 0.343*** 
   
(-3.47) (-0.27) (3.39) 
Note: a) Entries in the Table represent the marginal effects for the corresponding coefficients of dependent 
variables with leader fixed effect. b) T-statistics are in parenthesis.  c) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 









Table 1.8a Ordered Logit Estimates of Full-disclosure Treatment 
 All All (Leader Dummy) Type Type (Leader Dummy) 
Full 
-0.011 -0.335 0.778** 1.120* 
（-0.05） （-0.95） (2.30) (1.93) 
Intrinsic 
  0.874*** 1.833*** 
  (2.71) (3.23) 
Full & Intrinsic  
  -1.419*** -2.343*** 
  (-3.13) (-3.23) 
Leader Dummies No Yes No Yes 
Number of observations 312 312 312 312 
Log likelihood -267.413 -184.684 -262.193 -178.139 
Prob>chi2 0.960 0.005 0.015 0.001 
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.309 0.020 0.334 
Note: a) Entries in the Table represent the coefficients from separate regressions of the relevant dependent 
variable. b) T-statistics are in parenthesis. c) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. d) The standard 
errors are robust. e) Control and treatment groups for Full-disclosure: group 2 and 3. 
 
 






(△Y > 0) 
Constant 
(△Y = 0) 
Regress 
(△Y < 0) 
Progress 
(△Y > 0) 
Constant 
(△Y = 0) 
Regress 
(△Y < 0) 
Full 
-0.003 0.0001 0.003 0.190** -0.006 -0.185** 
(-0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (2.36) (-1.64) (-2.36) 
Intrinsic    
0.214*** -0.005* -0.209*** 
   
(2.79) (-1.70) (-2.77) 
Full & Intrinsic    
-0.339*** -0.002 0.340*** 
   
(-3.48) (-0.32) (3.37) 
Note: a) Entries in the Table represent the marginal effects for the corresponding coefficients of dependent 
variables with leader fixed effect. b) T-statistics are in parenthesis.  c) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 










Table 1.9a Ordered Logit Estimates of Social-information Treatment 
 All All (Leader Dummy) Type Type (Leader Dummy) 
Social 
0.056 0.029 0.724** 0.627 
（0.25） （0.09） (2.17) (1.25) 
Intrinsic 
  0.871*** 1.152** 
  (2.70) (2.35) 
Social & Intrinsic 
  -1.213*** -1.027 
  (-2.68) (-1.51) 
Leader Dummies No Yes No Yes 
Number of observations 312 312 312 312 
Log likelihood -264.361 -191.387 -260.057 -188.482 
Prob>chi2 0.802 0.041 0.034 0.027 
Pseudo R2 0.0001 0.276 0.016 0.287 
Note: a) Entries in the Table represent the coefficients from separate regressions of the relevant dependent 
variable. b) T-statistics are in parenthesis. c) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. d) The standard 
errors are robust. e) Control and treatment groups for Social-information: group 2 and 4. 
 
 






(△Y > 0) 
Constant 
(△Y = 0) 
Regress 
(△Y < 0) 
Progress 
(△Y > 0) 
Constant 
(△Y = 0) 
Regress 
(△Y < 0) 
Social 
0.014 -0.0004 -0.013 0.177** -0.005 -0.172** 
(0.25) (-0.25) (-0.25) (2.22) (-1.64) (-2.22) 
Intrinsic    
0.213*** -0.005* -0.207*** 
   
(2.78) (-1.79) (-2.76) 
Social & Intrinsic    
-0.294*** 0.001 0.293*** 
   
(-2.88) (0.15) (2.80) 
Note: a) Entries in the Table represent the marginal effects for the corresponding coefficients of dependent 
variables with leader fixed effect. b) T-statistics are in parenthesis.  c) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 










Table 1.10a Ordered Logit Estimates of Full&Social Treatment 
 All All (Leader Dummy) Type Type (Leader Dummy) 
Full&Social  
0.086 -0.605* 0.573* 0.583 
（0.38） （-1.75） (1.71) (1.12) 
Intrinsic 
  0.865*** 1.961*** 
  (2.69) (3.68) 
Full&Social & Intrinsic 
  -0.867* -2.305*** 
  (-1.91) (-3.13) 
Leader Dummies No Yes No Yes 
Number of observations 312 312 312 312 
Log likelihood -259.265 -185.330 -255.588 -117.558 
Prob>chi2 0.700 0.070 0.058 0.014 
Pseudo R2 0.0003 0.285 0.015 0.315 
Note: a) Entries in the Table represent the coefficients from separate regressions of the relevant dependent 
variable. b) T-statistics are in parenthesis. c) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. d) The standard 
errors are robust. e) Control and treatment groups for Full&Social: group 2 and 5. 
 
 






(△Y > 0) 
Constant 
(△Y = 0) 
Regress 
(△Y < 0) 
Progress 
(△Y > 0) 
Constant 
(△Y = 0) 
Regress 
(△Y < 0) 
Full&Social 
0.021 -0.001 -0.021 0.140* -0.004 -0.136* 
(0.38) (-0.38) (-0.38) (1.73) (-1.41) (-1.73) 
Intrinsic    
0.211*** -0.005* -0.206*** 
   
(2.76) (-1.78) (-2.74) 
Full&Social & Intrinsic    
-0.213** 0.002 0.211* 
   
(-1.96) (1.06) (1.93) 
Note: a) Entries in the Table represent the marginal effects for the corresponding coefficients of dependent 
variables with leader fixed effect. b) T-statistics are in parenthesis.  c) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 









Figure 1.1 Histograms of All Intrinsic and Extrinsic Items in Q25 
 
 
Note: Intrinsic motivation items are 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9; extrinsic motivation items are 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18. 
 
  




Form 1.1 The Questionnaire of Pre-event Survey for Volunteers in 
CHINAOPEN 2011 
Dear volunteer, 
Thank you very much for your hard work. Your contribution plays a vital role in the 
success of 2011 CHINA OPEN. As a part of volunteer survey, we hope you can fill the 
questionnaire according to your real situations and thought (such as: performance in pre-
training and the voluntary services during the competition etc.), which will improve our 
volunteer management. Whatever related to your personal information, we will keep it strictly 
confidential. Thank you for your support. 
Dept. of Volunteer, 2011 CHINA OPEN 
(Note: Please fill the blank with your real information; or write your choice to the end of the 
multiple choice question; or mark under the score in scale corresponding question.) 
 
1. Volunteer ID:               
2. Post:                   (For example: Dept. of Athletes, Transportation)(If you are the leader of 
your group, please write ―Leader‖ at the end) 
3. Voluntary period:     （For example: 2011/09/25-2011/09/30） 
4. Gender:     
5. Age:    
6. Ethnic group:           
7. Marital status:             
8. The years of education:        (Calculated from Primary school Grade 1) 
9. What’s your highest level of education completed? 
A. High school or below 
B. Polytechnic school (Zhong Zhuan) 




10. What’s your major? (You can choose more than one if you have a double-degree or multi-
















L. Military Science 
11. Are you major in foreign language? 
A. Yes. Explain:     (For example: English, French, German……) 
B. No 
12. Political status:     (For example: Communist Youth League, Chinese Communist Party……) 
13. Are you the only child in your family? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
14. What’s the annual income of your family? 
A. ￥10,000 or less 
B. ￥10,001 to ￥50,000 
C. ￥50,001 to ￥100,000 
D. ￥100,001 to ￥500,000 
E. ￥500,001 to ￥1,000,000 
F. ￥1,000,001 or more 
15. What’s your father’s highest level of education completed? 
A. High school or below 
B. Polytechnic school (Zhong Zhuan) 




16. What’s your mother’s highest level of education completed?  
A. High school or below 
B. Polytechnic school (Zhong Zhuan) 




17. What’s your monthly expenditure in last 12 months? 
A. ￥500 or less 
B. ￥501 to ￥1000 
C. ￥1001 to ￥1500 
D. ￥1501 to ￥2000 
E. ￥2001 to ￥2500 
F. ￥2501 to ￥3000 
G. ￥3001 or more 
18. Have you ever joint in any volunteer service organization (such as: Red Cross, volunteer 
association in university and so on)? 
A. Yes 









20. When was the first time you took an activity in volunteer service (if you have no experience, 
this service will be your first time)? 
A. Elementary school 
B. Secondary school 
C. High school 
D. University 
E. Others (Explain:      ) 
21. Apart from this event, have you ever taken part into any other voluntary services (such as: 
social services, environmental activities, sport events……)? 
A. Yes (please continue to answer Q22 and Q23) 
B. No (please jump to Q24) 
22. How long is your total voluntary experience? 
A. 1 month or less 
B. 2 months 
C. 3 months 
D. 4 months 
E. 5 months 
F. 6 months 
G. 7 months 
H. 8 months 
I. 9 months 
J. 10 months 
K. 11 months 
L. 12 months or more (Explain :      ) 
23. What type of the voluntary organization did you attend? (You can choose more than one 
answer) （Please jump to Q25）      
A. Domestic government organization 
B. Domestic NGO 
C. Foreign government organization 
D. Foreign NGO 
24. Read each item carefully. Using the scale below, please mark under the number that best 
describes the reason why you choose to be a volunteer. Answering each item according to 
the following scale: 1: corresponds not all; 2: corresponds very little; 3: corresponds a little; 
4: corresponds moderately; 5: corresponds enough; 6: corresponds a lot; 7: corresponds 
exactly. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. I do not have enough time        
2. I do not know what this service can gives me        




3. Little information about volunteer recruitment        
4. I can get some information about recruitment, but I am 
not sure if it is worth to do 
       
5. Lack of channels to participate in the voluntary services        
6. I have the channel to voluntary services, but I am not 
interested in it 
       
7. I cannot afford the voluntary activity        
8. I can afford the voluntary activity, but I am still not sure if 
I will join it 
       
9. The voluntary activity is not suitable for me        
25. Read each item carefully. Using the scale below, please mark under the number that best 
describes the reason why you choose to be a volunteer. Answering each item according to 
the following scale: 1: corresponds not all; 2: corresponds very little; 3: corresponds a little; 
4: corresponds moderately; 5: corresponds enough; 6: corresponds a lot; 7: corresponds 
exactly.  
Why do you choose to be a volunteer? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Volunteering provides me an opportunity to have a 
direct experience on the voluntary services which shapes 
me to be a better person. These experiences are valuable 
for my life. 
       
2. I hope I can make a contribution to my country.        
3. I have to help others because I’m more fortunate than 
them. 
       
4. I have the awareness for voluntary service as I have 
been doing voluntary service. 
       
5. Inspired by the publicity of the volunteer recruitment        
6. It is a good beginning for me to find a job        
7. I follow friends who are volunteering        
8. Encouragement from my school or institute for being a 
volunteer 
       
9.I can do something for a cause that is important to me        
10. Volunteering experience will look good on my resume        
11. Volunteering improves my self-esteem        
12. Volunteering allows me to explore different career 
options 
       
13. I can learn how to get along well with a variety of 
people 
       
14. I can explore my own strengths        
15. Volunteering is a way to make new friends        
16. Volunteering helps me to forget about the unpleasant 
encounters in my life 
       
17. Volunteering has a positive effect on my jobs or study        
18. Volunteering helps me work through personal 
problems 
       
Codification key: Intrinsic motivation: item 1. 2. 4. 5. 9; Extrinsic motivation: item 3. 6. 7. 8. 10. 
11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 
  





Form 1.2 Evaluation Form for Leaders 
Dear leader, 
Thank you very much for your participation in this survey. Your involvement will 
certainly help us to make CHINAOPEN 2011 a success. As part of volunteer survey, we hope 
you fill the questionnaire according to the performance of your group member. Your personal 
information will be kept strictly confidential. Thank you for your support. 
Dept. of Volunteer, CHINAOPEN 2011 
 
(Note: Answering each item according to the following scale: 1: corresponds not at all; 2: 
corresponds very little; 3: corresponds a little; 4: corresponds moderately; 5: corresponds 
enough; 6: corresponds a lot; 7: corresponds exactly.) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Attendance        
Punctuality        
Sense of responsibility        
Initiative        
Commitment        
Efficiency        
Relationship with other volunteers        
Relationship with service target        
 
 
Total Score:                
 
Volunteer ID:                           
 
  





Form 1.3 Self-Assessment Form for Volunteers 
Dear volunteer, 
Thank you very much for your participation in this survey. Your involvement will 
certainly help us to make CHINAOPEN 2011 a success. As part of volunteer survey, we hope 
you fill the questionnaire according to your real situations and thought (such as: performance in 
pre-training and the voluntary services during the competition etc.) in order to improve our 
volunteer management. Your personal information will be kept strictly confidential. Thank you 
for your support. 
Dept. of Volunteer, CHINAOPEN 2011 
 
(Note: Answering each item according to the following scale: 1: corresponds not at all; 2: 
corresponds very little; 3: corresponds a little; 4: corresponds moderately; 5: corresponds 
enough; 6: corresponds a lot; 7: corresponds exactly.) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Attendance        
Punctuality        
Sense of responsibility        
Initiative        
Commitment        
Efficiency        
Relationship with other volunteers        
Relationship with service target        
 
 
Total Score:                
 
Volunteer ID:                            









Volunteering is often regarded as being fundamental for the sustainability of civil 
society. For example, in order for non-profit organizations to exist and to be 
effective, individuals must continue to offer their volunteer services. In particular, 
college students in both developed and developing countries
4
 place more emphasis 
on volunteering compared with other groups of the population. However, while the 
body of knowledge on why college students participate in volunteering 
organizations is rich in studies by social scientists, psychologists, and political 
scientists, this question receives much less attention in economics. 
This study examines the specific volunteering motivation of college students 
based on the interpretation of two classical economics models: consumption and 
investment. The consumption model explains volunteering as a utility-bearing 
activity. Under this assumption, an individual will make his or her decision to 
volunteer in order to maximize his or her utility given the constraints on current 
income. A pure consumption model expects that volunteering activities only 
contribute directly to utility and do not affect future earnings. By contrast, under the 
investment model, volunteering is treated as enhancing the volunteer’s labor market 
                                                            
4 For more statistics, please see http://www.volunteeringinamerica.gov/ and http://www.zgzyz.org.cn/. 




value, and thus the amount of time donated is driven by the individual’s desire to 
achieve a higher level of future income. 
To explore the volunteering motivation from the perspective of these two 
models, the relationship between income and the decision to volunteer has been 
well studied by previous researchers, and it is also the focal point of this study. On 
the one hand, the more enjoyment acquired from the volunteering activity at the 
margin, the higher is the opportunity cost that volunteers are willing to sacrifice (the 
current income at the time undertaking the volunteering activity is used to measure 
the opportunity cost of volunteering). On the other hand, a higher current income 
increases demand for normal consumption goods, which may include volunteering 
in the consumption model. Hence, the consumption model predicts that an 
individual that has a higher current income may volunteer more, whereas the 
investment model predicts that a volunteer has a higher probability of obtaining a 
higher future income. However, the main barrier for previous empirical studies in 
the economics literature comes from the lack of data on future income; thus, current 
income must be used as a proxy for future income, resulting in an endogeneity 
problem
5
 (for more discussion on such endogeneity problems, see Menchik and 
Weisbrod, 1987; Vaillancourt, 1994; Day and Devlin, 1996; Fiorillo, 2011). 
The empirical results presented thus far in the economics literature on the 
relationship between current income and volunteering are ambiguous. For example, 
                                                            
5 In general, causality between the independent and dependent variables of a model leads to a simultaneous 
(endogeneity) problem. 




Choi and Chou (2010) suggest that as income grows, so does the potential for an 
individual to have a broader social network, which increases the chances of 
volunteering. A higher income leads to a larger number of volunteers in that income 
range and more volunteering, as measured in hours per month (Toppe, Kirsch, and 
Michel, 2001; Mustillo, Wilson, and Lynch, 2004; Tang, 2006; Nesbit, 2010). On 
the contrary, Steinberg, Rooney, and Chin (2002) find no such correlation between 
income and volunteering propensity based on information from volunteers in 
Indiana when they control for demographic factors. 
 In addition, an increasing (decreasing) wage rate is associated with a decline 
(rise) in voluntary work because of the substitution relationship between paid work 
and volunteering. Therefore, drawing the conclusion that the absence of an 
empirical correlation between current income and volunteering confirms the 
irrelevance of the consumption model seems to be premature, since the substitution 
and income effects of a change in the wage rate may cancel each other out. 
In summary, the prevailing evidence on unpaid labor supply is inconclusive, and 
more research is needed to explore the consumption and investment motives. In 
particular, the difficulty of observing the current incomes of college students owing 
to their lack of full-time jobs complicates the investigation of their motivation for 
volunteering. This complexity partly explains why college volunteers receive 
insufficient attention in the economics literature. 
In this study, we show that the integration of consumption aspects into the 




investment model is helpful for understanding and testing both the consumption and 
the investment motives. More importantly, the dataset used in this study is able to 
shed light on the volunteering motivation of college students. Specifically, the 
sample used herein is composed of two parts: volunteers at the Shanghai World 
Expo 2010 in China (SWE hereafter) and volunteers and non-volunteers on the 
RenDa Economics Forum (REF), one of the main social networking sites in China. 
Our dataset has several advantages. First, a large proportion of volunteers at 
SWE were college students, thereby serving our purpose of exploring the 
motivation behind college volunteers. More importantly, our surveys were 
conducted from September to December 2012, approximately two years after SWE 
had ended. This ―delayed‖ study therefore provides us with information on college 
(non-)volunteers, such as whether they participated in volunteering activities in 
2010 and, if so, how long the volunteering activity lasted, as well as information on 
future income, measured by the first full-time salary after graduation. 
To overcome the above-mentioned issue of missing current income for college 
students, this study uses either household income (i.e., parental income) or their 
individual monthly consumption during the volunteering period as a proxy for 
unobservable current income. The main advantage of this approach is to avoid the 
substitution and income effects cancelling one another out, because household 
income or monthly consumption could be considered to be extra income no matter 
how long or how hard students work, leading to a pure income effect. 




In addition to the basic regression, in order to control for the ability of 
participants, this study also includes their scores in their National College Entrance 
Exam (NCEE, or GaoKao in Mandarin), which is undertaken at the completion of 
secondary school for seeking admission to higher education intuitions in China (and 
thereby considered to be a milestone for young Chinese). This method allows us to 
check the robustness of the estimated results, which include grade point average 
(GPA) during college and future income, when we explore how current income 
influences volunteering. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section 
describes the integrated model of investment and consumption motives and presents 
the two hypotheses tested herein. In Section 2.3, the data are described in detail, 
while Section 2.4 introduces the empirical strategies and discusses the results. The 
conclusion is presented in the last section. 
 
2.2 Integrated Model of Investment and Consumption Motives 
Economics theorists have generally applied two microeconomic models 
(consumption and investment) to explain volunteering behavior (e.g., Andreoni, 
1990; Freeman, 1996; Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987). Volunteers in the 
consumption model derive utility from giving per se. In other words, the prestige 
associated with the process of volunteering drives individuals to volunteer, 
including the integration in the community, the satisfaction of achieving social 




status, or the ―warm glow‖ from doing something good. By contrast, the direct quid 
pro quo, or the exchange value benefit, obtained from volunteering, although some 
present resource (wage or income) has to be forgone, is regarded as investment 
motivation for volunteers. In this line of thought, volunteering can enhance the 
volunteer’s market value (e.g., improve human capital accumulation), as he or she 
may receive career-related training or acquire new skills, or have the opportunity to 
signal his or her ability to prospective employers (Montgomery, 1992; Duncan, 
1999). In contrast to the consumption motivation, volunteering is the result of a 
dynamic maximization problem. 
In order to explore these two motives, this study builds an integrated model of 
the investment and consumption motives when volunteering. It is first assumed that 
the consumer wishes to maximize his or her utility 
1 2( , , )U c c v  , by means of 
consumption in the first and second periods c1 and c2, respectively and by means of 
the allocation of time to volunteering, v. The utility function is strictly increasing 
and concave. 
Second, we assume exogenous wages in periods 1 and 2, termed w1 and w2, 
respectively. In each period, an individual has a time endowment T, which can be 
allocated to working or to volunteering. Time allocated to volunteering in the first 
period, v, may raise the future wage rate through the increase in human capital, i.e. 
2 ( ) 0w v  . For convenience, volunteering in the second period is assumed to be 
zero (i.e., all time is allocated to working). 




The capital market is assumed to be perfect, meaning that the borrowing rate 
and the lending rate are equal, denoted as r. The budget constraints in each period 
are given as 1 1( )c s T v w   and 2 2( ) (1 )c Tw v s r   , where s stands for savings 
in period 1. This model derives to a pure investment model if utility depends on 
volunteering indirectly (in so far as volunteering contributes to future earnings). 
However, the model derives to a pure consumption model of volunteering if 
volunteering only contributes directly to utility (but does not influence future 
earnings). 
In conjunction with the intertemporal discounted budget constraint, the problem 
of utility maximization can thus be stated as follows: 
max 1 2( , , )U c c v                                                                                       (2.a1) 
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                                                              (2.a2) 
and the time constraint 
v T                                                                                                         (2.a3) 
With non-satiation preferences, the equality is binding in the consolidated 
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                                                            (2.a7) 
where 
2( )w v  denotes the marginal second-period wage rate of volunteering. The 
Lagrangian multiplier,  , is strictly positive and this can be interpreted as the 
marginal utility of consumption in (2.a4). From equations (2.a4) and (2.a5), we 
obtain 
1 2








, implying that the marginal utility of consumption in 
period 1 should be the same as that in period 2 multiplied by the return on savings. 





 = 0, the pure 
investment model), 
2 1( ) / (1 )= 0w v T r w   is derived from equation (2.a6). In other 
words, under the pure investment model, volunteering positively correlates with 
future income and the time allocated to volunteering is chosen in order to equate the 
price of volunteering (e.g., the opportunity cost 1w ) to the incremental future 
discounted earnings. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 2.1: The pure investment model forecasts a positive impact of 
volunteering on the future income. 
 
In a pure consumption model of volunteering, future earnings are independent 
of volunteering in earlier periods; hence,  2 2( )w v w  and 2 ( ) 0w v   and then 













 is derived from equations (2.a4) and (2.a6) if the earnings foregone 
w1 are strictly positive. This implies that the higher is the enjoyment acquired from 
the volunteering activity at the margin, the higher is the opportunity cost that 
volunteers are willing to sacrifice. The opportunity cost of volunteering is typically 










, there are opposing income and substitution effects of a 
higher current wage on volunteering. The income effect is positive when 
consumption and volunteering are normal goods. In the presence of diminishing 
marginal utilities, however, the substitution effect of a higher current wage on 





 driven by 
a higher current wage rate implies fewer volunteering activities. If the income effect 
dominates the substitution effect, there is a positive relationship between current 
income and volunteering. In particular, since financial support from families or 
universities serves as a significant source of income for college students in China, 
the substitution effect is expected to be very weak. Hence, we formulate our second 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2.2: The pure consumption model predicts a positive relationship 
between current income and volunteering when the substitution effect is weaker 




than the income effect. 
 
If volunteering correlates positively with current income as well as with future 
income, it is the hybrid of these two motives. This is possible since the consumption 
and investment models are not mutually exclusive. 
 
2.3 Data 
To explore the motivation of college volunteers, the study was designed and 
conducted under the following framework. In the first step, we designed a self-
reported online survey that asked respondents about their demographics, 
volunteering status in our sample period of May 1 to October 31, 2010
6
 , and 
working status after graduation.  
The SWE sample consists of volunteers only, while the REF sample consists of 
both volunteers and non-volunteers. As a result, we have two versions of the survey: 
Form 2.1 for volunteers at SWE and Form 2.2 for (non-)volunteers on REF. 
Although these two versions present slight differences, both ask about participants’ 
demographics such as gender, age, education, number of siblings, parental 
education, household income, monthly consumption, and study status including the 
type of college and major, NCEE information, and GPA. Both surveys also query 
whether the respondent was a volunteer in our study period and if so, whether he or 
                                                            
6 This period was chosen because SWE formally started on May 1, 2010 and ended on October 31, 2010 and 
thus we need to merge SWE volunteers with the REF sample. 




she was a member of a non-profit organization, longevity/hours volunteered, and 
motivation for volunteering. The final more than twenty questions ask respondents’ 
working status after graduation and their perceived influence of volunteering on 
working. 
[Insert Form 2.1 and Form 2.2] 
From September 1, 2012, invitations for the online survey were distributed by 
email to volunteers at SWE (see http://www.expo2010-volunteer.com) and 
published on REF (see http://bbs.pinggu.org) at the same time. All study 
participants had the chance to earn entry (by completing the online survey) to a 
prize draw held at the conclusion of the study. We awarded one 100 RMB, two 50 
RMB, and twenty 20 RMB cash prizes to participants at the end of the study. Using 
prize draws is a standard method to induce users to complete online surveys 
(Bosnjak and Tuten, 2003). 
At the beginning of the survey, the instruction on its purpose was stated as 
follows: As part of a volunteer survey, we are conducting research on the 
motivations of college students to volunteer. Anonymity was guaranteed by sending 
the email separately and the answers could solely be seen by the main investigator, 
who downloaded the electronic surveys from the Internet and monitored the online 
survey daily to download any newly completed responses. Surveys were collected 
until December 1, 2012, after which the answers were coded, entered into STATA 
version 12, and analyzed by using descriptive and econometrics statistics. 




The total number of questionnaires distributed to volunteers at SWE was 53,845, 
but only 6598 replies were returned, of which 2241 were valid (i.e., completed 
replies without obvious logical faults such as inconsistencies in age and education 
year). For the purpose of this study, respondents had to have been college students 
in 2010 and working during the survey period in 2012 to be included in the study. 
These inclusion criteria might have caused selection bias, because college 
graduate unemployment is known to be an issue in China. Hence, those students 
who volunteer that have an investment motivation may be more likely to find a job 
and thus be included in the survey, biasing the results towards supporting the 
investment model. In order to alleviate this bias, this study checked robustness only 
among those college students who graduated from first-tier colleges, which have an 
employment rate above 90% (see 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel1/12/20001121/321158.html). The 
robustness check is presented in Section 2.4. 
The low response rate was not surprising, since the survey for volunteers at 
SWE occurred in the second half of 2012, almost two years after the SWE had been 
held. A number of volunteers may therefore have changed their contact details, 
resulting in many undelivered or unread questionnaires. Thanks to the huge sample 
size of volunteers at SWE, we still obtained 2241 valid replies. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that this is only a subset of all the volunteers at SWE, whose 
motivations may differ from those of non-respondents. 




In addition to the volunteers at SWE, we collected 4285 questionnaires from 
REF, of which 63.8% (2734 replies) were valid. Since the SWE sample is mainly 
from colleges located in Shanghai, whereas REF users are spread across the country, 
one concern is that the population undergoing comparison could be systematically 
different. Thus, we deleted respondents who studied in colleges outside Shanghai in 
order to control for this potential bias. Figure 2.1 provides the summary statistics on 
the geographic residence information of the origins of college students
7
 after 
omitting respondents from non-Shanghai colleges, showing that the origin of 
college students from Shanghai accounts for the largest proportion in both samples 
(57.88% for SWE and 56.23% for REF). 
[Insert Figure 2.1] 
As a result, we included 125 valid replies from REF respondents that had 
volunteering experience and 156 from REF respondents that did not. Hence, total 
volunteers accounted for 93.81% (0.9381 = (2241+125)/(2241+281)) of the whole 
valid sample including SWE and REF. 
[Insert Table 2.1] 
Descriptive statistics on demographics, volunteer data, and working status after 
graduation are reported in Table 2.1. Where appropriate, the mean and standard 
deviation are listed. Since our study focuses on college students in 2010, the results 
show that most respondents were aged around 24 in 2012, with almost 27% living 
in a high-educated family, as defined by their parental education (mother or father 
                                                            
7 The origin of college students refers to the place where students complete their NCEE before entering college. 




having obtained at least a college degree). Owing to the only-child policy in China, 
77.24% of respondents did not have any siblings. Household income refers to 
respondents’ parental income per annum in 2010, while monthly consumption is the 
respondent’s individual consumption in the same year. Although respondents 
answered their monthly consumption as average consumption per month, in order to 
keep a consistent measure of household income, Table 2.1 reports monthly 
consumption as twelve times the average consumption per month. Further, the 







                                                                 (2.b) 
where   
iptcNCEE  and ptcAveNCEE  
are individual i’s NCEE score and the average 
NCEE score in the same province p, year t, and category of exam c (Arts or 
Sciences or both
8
 ) and 
ptc  is the corresponding standard error. Because the 
calculation methods for the NCEE score may differ by province, year, and category, 
it is difficult to compare original NCEE scores directly, which is why we used the 
SNCEE score instead. 
The variable GPA stands for the respondent’s GPA during college. In China, 
GPA is calculated based on two systems: four-score and five-score. Generally 
speaking, a GPA below four in the five-score system has a similar value to that in 
the four-score system, but the five-score system specifies the top score in more 
detail. For example, if two students get 90 and 95 (out of 100), their GPAs will be 4 
                                                            
8 In certain provinces such as Guangdong, the NCEE does not distinguish between Arts and Sciences students in 
some years (e.g., 2006). 




and 4.5 under the five-score system but both of them will receive 4 under the four-
score system. Hence, to simplify our analyses, we transferred the GPA in the five-
score system into that in the four-score system by treating all GPAs above four as 
four. 
The dummy variables college and major refer to the respondent’s college type 
and major. Specifically, college is divided into five groups according to the college 
admission criteria in China: 1) advance colleges (colleges that recruit college 
students earlier than other types, such as military colleges), 2) first-tier colleges 
(public and key colleges), 3) second-tier colleges (public colleges that require lower 
NCEE scores than key colleges), 4) third-tier colleges (private or independent 
colleges), and 5) vocational or technical colleges. In line with a standard Bachelor’s 
degree in China, major is divided into twelve categories: Philosophy, Economics, 
Law, Pedagogy, Arts, History, Science, Engineering, Agronomy, Medicine, 
Management, and Military. From Table 2.1, we can see that most students in our 
sample studied at first- (50.67%) and second-tier (46%) colleges, while the four 
most popular majors are Engineering (25.34%), Economics (22.76%), Management 
(19.31%), and Arts (16.26%). 
As REF volunteers are expected to be largely Economics majors, while the 
volunteers at SWE could come from different backgrounds, Figure 2.2 plots the 
distribution of the sample populations by major. As expected, Economics ranks as 
the top major (25.98%) in the REF sample. Although the proportion of Economics 




in the SWE sample is not as high, it is still the second most popular major (22.36%). 
 [Insert Figure 2.2] 
The middle part in Table 2.1 reports the statistics on volunteering data. Among 
the total sample, 2366 observations are volunteers, accounting for 93.81%, while 
the mean hours volunteered in our sample period is 46.15. League describes the 
percentage of respondents who have been a member of a non-profit organization 
such as the Red Cross. 
Working status after graduation is presented at the bottom of Table 2.1. Future 
income is defined as the first full-time yearly salary of the respondent after 
graduation. In order to control for the influence of regional income differences, the 
dummy variable workarea classifies the five regions in China: West, Central, 
Northeast, East, and Hong Kong/Macau/Taiwan (HK/MC/TW)
9
. From this dummy 
variable, it is clear that the majority of fresh college students (91.36%) prefer to 
stay and work in the highly developed East region that includes Beijing, Shanghai, 
and Guangdong. 
In addition, ownership is categorized into five groups based on the firm type in 
which the respondent works: private enterprises, state-owned enterprises, foreign 
enterprises, joint venture enterprises, and government institutions. The proportion of 
college students that work in state-owned enterprises is slightly higher than those of 
                                                            
9 The provinces in the West region are Chongqing, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Xinjiang, Neimenggu, Ningxia, 
Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Tibet, and Yunnan. The provinces in the Central region are Anhui, Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan, Jiangxi, and Shanxi. The provinces in the Northeast region are Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning. The 
provinces in the East region are Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, and Zhejiang. 




other categories, while joint ventures hire the lowest proportion, only 8.92%. 
  
2.4 Empirical Strategies and Results 
Consistent with the literature, the relationship between income and volunteering is 
used in this study to explore volunteering motivation. As analyzed in our integrated 
model, a positive influence of volunteering on future income tends to support the 
validity of the investment model, while a positive correlation between current 
income and volunteering is likely to indicate the consumption model. However, 
current income cannot be observed because of the low proportion of college 
students that have full-time jobs. As such, it is necessary to find a suitable proxy for 
their current income in order to test the consumption model. 
If students cannot borrow against their future income, they either depend on 
their parents or seek part-time work. In China, more and more college students 
choose to seek part-time jobs in their spare time, but most do not have an economic 
motive for doing so (Chen, Zhang, Ye, and Sun, 2005; Zhao and Cai, 2012). This 
phenomenon could be explained by several reasons. First, the wages for part-time 
jobs are not high enough to cover daily expenses. For example, the most frequent 
part-time jobs are being a tutor, distributing leaflets, and sales promotion, whose 
hourly earnings are only approximately 8–15 RMB (Zhao and Cai, 2012). Moreover, 
a high proportion of college students (72%) work fewer than 20 hours per month 
(Chen et al., 2005). Second, the Chinese government emphasizes student loan 




programs to help out poorer college students. Current student loan programs are 
divided into two groups: (i) commercial loans without any subsidy from the 
government and (ii) national student loans at preferential interest rates. Although 
the latter look attractive, they are strictly restricted to poorer college students
10
. 
Our study proposes that household income or monthly consumption is a suitable 
proxy for a college student’s current income, because the majority of sampled 
individuals rely on their parents’ income to fund their college experience. Thus, 
household income provides a current income constraint, while monthly 
consumption reflects household income to some extent. Hence, while household 
income and monthly consumption tend to have a close correlation with a student’s 
current income, they are not directly correlated with his or her decision to volunteer. 
 
In the theoretical model, current wage has opposing income and substitution 
effects on volunteering. If the income effect dominates the substitution effect, there 
is a positive relationship between current income and volunteering. If household 
income or monthly consumption is taken as a proxy for current income in the 
empirical analysis, the substitution effect is expected to be very weak, because most 
college students receive a ―fixed income‖ from their parents and thus there is no 
trade-off between volunteering and working. Therefore, it would be mainly 
considered to be an income effect without much concern about the substitution 
                                                            
10 For more details on the restrictive conditions, please see 
http://www.csls.cdb.com.cn/page.do?targetPage=/portal/Index.jsp. 





NCEE score and GPA are acknowledged as suitable indexes with which to 
measure the potential ability of a college student, but we only include NCEE score 
as a control variable for potential income. (We use GPA as a robustness check 
because the GPA variable might be endogenous owing to the time trade-off between 
studying and volunteering at college, whereas NCEE is predetermined before 
college.) Likewise, the future income of college students might cause an 
endogenous issue. Hence, it is also controlled for in a robustness test when we 
explore the relation between volunteering and current income. Moreover, we 
control for the demographic variables in our regressions. 
In the following empirical estimations, volunteering is captured by two 
dimensions: (i) the dichotomous variable V is equal to one if the individual 
volunteers and zero otherwise and (ii) the number of hours volunteered in our study 
period, denoted as H. We then use the Probit model to analyze the participation 
decision (V) and Tobit model for volunteering hours (H). The relationship between 
volunteering and current income is specified as 
1 1 1 iptc 2 1 1V ln CI SNCEE
V 1[H 0]
X u       
 
                                                       (2.1) 
2 2 3 iptc 4 1 2H ln CI SNCEE + X u                                                              (2.2) 
and the relationship between future income and volunteering is specified as 
3 3 5 iptc 6 2 3ln FI V SNCEE
V 1[H 0]
X u       
 
                                                        (2.3) 




4 4 7 iptc 8 2 4ln FI H SNCEE X u                                                                (2.4) 
where CI refers to the college student’s yearly current income in 2010, proxied by 
household income or monthly consumption; FI refers to future income, measured 
by the student’s full-time yearly salary after graduation; SNCEE is defined as 
previously; X represents the vectors of individual demographic variables: X1 in 
equations 2.1 and 2.2 includes variables such as the gender, age, parental education, 
only-child, league, college, and major dummies; X2 in equations 2.3 and 2.4 
includes workarea and ownership (all variables are reported in Table 2.1);  ,  , 
and   symbolize the coefficients to be estimated; and u denotes the error term. 
Under our framework, if the estimates of 
3  and 4 instead of 1  and 2  are 
significantly positive, the results tend to support the dominance of the investment 
motive. On the contrary, the consumption motive is likely to be dominant if the 
estimates of 1  and 2  instead of 3  and 4 are significantly positive, especially 
because the substitution effect is not a serious problem in our sample, as mentioned 
earlier. 
[Insert Table 2.2] 
Table 2.2 reports the marginal effect of the Probit regression of the dummy 
variable V on current income, reflected in equation 2.1, in which the odd (even) 
columns show the estimations when we use household income (or monthly 
consumption) as a proxy for current income. The basic regressions without any 
other control variables are presented in the first two columns, where both proxies 




are shown to positively influence V. In particular, an increase in logarithmic 
household income (thousand RMB) and monthly consumption (thousand RMB) 
leads to a 35.6 and 25.4 percentage point decrease in the individual’s propensity to 
volunteer. As discussed earlier, in order to control for potential ability, SNCEE is 
included, and the estimations shown in columns 3 and 4 tell a similar story, namely 
that current income tends to positively affect the decision to volunteer. The negative 
signs of SNCEE could be a result of the fact that academically stronger students 
have less need to invest in volunteering activities. The robust test results on GPA 
and logarithmic future income are reported in columns 5 to 8. Compared with the 
estimates that include all control variables (columns 9 and 10), we find consistent 
results, namely the positive impact of current income, irrespective of whether we 
omit GPA (columns 5 and 6) or logarithmic future income (columns 7 and 8). 
However, GPA reduces the intention of college students to volunteer regardless of 
which proxy we use. This finding could be explained by the time clash between 
studying and volunteering while at college or that academically stronger students 
have less need to volunteer (similar to SNCEE). The estimates on future income 
correlate with V positively under both proxies. 
In addition to the key variables, the signs of the estimations of the other 
demographic variables, shown by the corresponding coefficients in columns 9 and 
10, are consistent with the literature. In particular, we find that women are more 
likely to volunteer and that the age is negatively correlated with the probability of 




volunteering before retirement. In addition, individuals from highly educated 
families and members of non-profit organizations tend to contribute more to 
volunteering. The positive coefficient of the variable only-child also shows the 
stronger enthusiasm for volunteering for only children, which suggests that 
individuals without any siblings might not necessarily be more selfish than those 
with siblings. 
[Insert Table 2.3] 
The results of the econometric estimations based on equation 2.2 are presented 
in Table 2.3, which differs from equation 2.1 by using volunteer hours (H) instead 
of the dummy variable V. If the relationship parameter 2 were estimated by 
regressing observed volunteering hours on current income, the resulting OLS 
estimator would be inconsistent and would yield a downwards-biased estimate of 
the slope coefficient. Hence, the Tobit regression, which is left censoring at H = 0, 
is employed in order to reduce this kind of selection bias. The results in Table 2.3 
are similar to those in Table 2.2 (except that the coefficient of league becomes 
negative but not statistically significant). In particular, a higher current income, 
regardless of being proxied by household income or monthly consumption, leads to 
a significantly larger devotion to volunteering. 
One important issue is that household income could also be a good proxy for 
students’ social status and future opportunity, leading to less pressure for them to 
―invest‖ by volunteering. This factor might cause the influence of household 




income on volunteering to work in the opposite direction (i.e., become negative). 
However, the positive estimates from both Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provide tentative 
support for the validity of the consumption motive. 
 [Insert Table 2.4] 
Equation 2.3 and 2.4 are proposed to test the impact of volunteering on future 
income. The odd columns in Table 2.4 use the dummy variable V, while the even 
columns use the continuous variable H. From the estimates in Table 2.4, we cannot 
find a significantly positive influence of volunteering on future income with or 
without controlling for the demographic and working status variables, as shown in 
rows 1 and 2. 
From our results, students that have a higher SNCEE have higher future incomes, 
while male students are more likely to receive a higher first salary. However, our 
results do not necessarily imply that men have more advantages at work, as it is 
possible that women could receive a faster or higher promotion once they start 
working. Another result worth mentioning is that future income is strongly 
positively correlated with parental education. The possible explanation of this 
finding is the broader social network the student is able to exploit when his or her 
parents are more educated (which is often associated with having a higher social 
status). 
The HK, MC, and TW regions have a significant lead over Mainland China in 
terms of income level, as shown by the coefficients of workarea. As expected, the 




type of working organization has a close relation with income level, with higher 
levels of income occurring in foreign and joint venture enterprises on average. To 
summarize, regardless of whether we control for other factors, the results are more 
likely to imply that SNCEE, gender, age, parental education, working location, and 
the type of working organization capture more information on future income than 
volunteering does. In other words, the future income of college students is likely to 
be independent of volunteering behavior. 
As illustrated before, our sample might include selection bias caused by the high 
graduate unemployment in China. Therefore, to check the robustness of the 
estimates reported in Tables 2.2 to 2.4, we explore the relationship between income 
and volunteering only among those college students who graduated from first-tier 
colleges. The relevant results are presented in Tables 2.5 to 2.7. Compared with the 
previous results, there were no significant changes to the estimated effects. 
[Insert Table 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7] 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Volunteering is regarded as a socially and economically desirable activity. The 
consumption and investment models provide two core categories of volunteering 
motivations. However, although some existing works provide evidence on the 
validity of both models, the available empirical results are inconclusive and little 
attention has been paid to college volunteers in the economics literature. 




Our data provide a good opportunity to study the motivation of college 
volunteers. Based on the results from the online surveys, we find strong support for 
the consumption motive but also note that volunteering activities do not play a 
significant role in determining future income compared with other factors such as 
SNCEE, gender, age, parental education, working location, and the type of working 
organization. This result provides employers with the useful insight that job 
candidates that have a background of volunteering may not have higher human 
capital than those that have never volunteered under the same conditions. 
From our results, however, we cannot conclude that all people are purely driven 
by the consumption motive, because some might be motivated by the ―consumption‖ 
aspect of volunteering yet still gain ―unintended investment benefits‖ from it. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion could be drawn that the consumption motive holds a 
dominant position for college volunteers. 
As far as the investment motive is concerned, we find no clear statistical 
evidence for its validity. However, the absence of support does not necessarily 
invalidate this hypothesis, because the restricted selection of our sample (i.e., 
college volunteers) might explain this outcome. These findings imply that different 
types of volunteers should not be simply treated as a homogeneous group. Further 
research should thus aim to address the motives of different types of volunteers. 
  




Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Mean Stand Dev 
Demographics    
 Male 43.93% 0.496 
 Age 24.02 1.714 
 Only-Child 77.24% 0.419 
 Parental Education 27.12% 0.445 
 Household Income (thousand RMB) 148.74 179.388 
 Monthly Consumption (thousand RMB) 17.26 11.773 
 SNCEE -0.03 1.017 
 GPA 3.32 0.493 
 College   
 Advance 0.08% 0.028 
 First-tier 50.67% 0.500 
 Second-tier 46.00% 0.498 
 Third-tier 2.30% 0.150 
 Vocational 0.95% 0.097 
 Major   
 Philosophy 0.59% 0.077 
 Economics 22.76% 0.419 
 Law  4.52% 0.208 
 Pedagogy 3.85% 0.192 
 Arts 16.26% 0.369 
 History 0.24% 0.049 
 Science 4.92% 0.216 
 Engineering 25.34% 0.435 
 Agronomy 0.32% 0.056 
 Medical 1.90% 0.137 




 Volunteering (V) 93.81% 0.241 
 Volunteerhrs (H) 46.15 41.210 
 League 64.27% 0.479 
    
Working Status 
after Graduation 
   
 Future Income (thousand RMB) 32.72 199.339 
 Workarea   
        West 3.25% 0.177 
        Central 4.44% 0.206 
        Northeast 0.83% 0.091 
        East 91.36% 0.281 
        HK, MC and TW 0.12% 0.035 
 Ownership   
        Private enterprise 20.90% 0.407 
 State-owned enterprise 28.23% 0.450 
 Foreign enterprise 21.49% 0.411 
 Joint venture enterprise 8.92% 0.285 
 Government institutions 20.46% 0.403 
Note: a) SNCEE refers to individual i’s Standardized National College Entrance Exam score; League describes 
the percentage of respondents who have been a member of a non-profit organization such as the Red 
Cross 
b) The number of observation for all variables in Table is 2522 except that the number of observation for 
volunteerhrs (H) is 2366. 
 
  





Table 2.2 Marginal Effect of Probit Regression of Dummy  
for Volunteering on Current Income 
 
  Dummy for Volunteering (V) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 



































































































    (-2.78) (-2.82) (-2.89) (-2.94) 















































































































  (41.94) (22.80) (14.40) (16.38) (11.09) (11.26) 
College  No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Major  No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2  0.022  0.011  0.023  0.011  0.298  0.293 0.306  0.302  0.307  0.304  
N 2522 2522 2522 2522 2505 2505 2505 2505 2505 2505 
Note: a) t statistics in parentheses.  
b) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
c) The standard errors are clustered.  
d) All income variables (household income, monthly consumption and future income) are in thousands. 
e) SNCEE refers to individual i’s Standardized National College Entrance Exam score; League is the dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the respondent has been the member of some non-profit organizations, like the Red Cross. College includes five 
categories: advance, first-tier, second-tier, third-tier, and vocational; Major includes twelve categories: Philosophy, 
Economics, Law, Pedagogy, Arts, History, Science, Engineering, Agronomy, Medicine, Management, and Military. 
 
  





Table 2.3 Tobit Regression of Hours Volunteered 
 on Current Income 
 
Hours Volunteered (H) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 






























































0.301 -0.228 -0.429 -0.312 -0.565 -0.458 -0.469 -0.354 
 
 




    -2.746 -2.857 -2.707 -2.816 
 
 
    (-1.53) (-1.58) (-1.51) (-1.56) 
























































  0.484 1.597 0.640 1.776 0.446 1.553 
 
 








 3.381 3.257 3.283 3.148 
 
 




  -0.476 -0.220 -0.395 -0.135 -0.363 -0.102 
 
 
  (-0.27) (-0.12) (-0.22) (-0.07) (-0.20) (-0.06) 
College No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Major No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2  0.002  0.0003  0.002  0.0003  0.005  0.004  0.005  0.004 0.005  0.004  
N 2522 2522 2522 2522 2522 2522 2522 2522 2522 2522 
Note: a) t statistics in parentheses 
b) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
c) The standard errors are clustered.  
d) All income variables (household income, monthly consumption and future income) are in thousands. 
e) SNCEE refers to individual i’s Standardized National College Entrance Exam score; League is the dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the respondent has been the member of some non-profit organizations, like the Red Cross. College includes 
five categories: advance, first-tier, second-tier, third-tier, and vocational; Major includes twelve categories: Philosophy, 
Economics, Law, Pedagogy, Arts, History, Science, Engineering, Agronomy, Medicine, Management, and Military. 
 
  




Table 2.4 OLS of Future Income on the Dummy for  
Volunteering and Hours Volunteered 
 
Log of (Future Income) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 









































































































































College No No Yes Yes 
Major No No Yes Yes 
Adj R2  0.000  0.001  0.024  0.024  
N 2522 2522 2522 2522 
Note: a) t statistics in parentheses 
  b) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
c) The standard errors are clustered.  
d) The future income is in thousands. 
e) SNCEE refers to individual i’s Standardized National College Entrance Exam score; League is 
the dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has been the member of some non-profit 
organizations, like the Red Cross. College includes five categories: advance, first-tier, second-
tier, third-tier, and vocational; Major includes twelve categories: Philosophy, Economics, Law, 
Pedagogy, Arts, History, Science, Engineering, Agronomy, Medicine, Management, and 
Military. 
 





Table 2.5 Marginal Effect of Probit Regression of Dummy  
for Volunteering on Current Income among First-Tier Colleges 
 
Dummy for Volunteering (V) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 































































































    (-3.15) (-3.07) (-3.49) (-3.41) 















































































































  (10.09) (11.07) (62.88) (47.07) (17.59) (13.46) 
College  No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Major  No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2  0.011  0.009  0.011  0.037  0.283  0.282 0.284 0.282  0.291  0.291  
N 1278 1278 1278 1278 1202 1202 1202 1202 1202 1202 
Note: a) t statistics in parentheses.  
b) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
c) The standard errors are clustered.  
d) All income variables (household income, monthly consumption and future income) are in thousands. 
e) SNCEE refers to individual i’s Standardized National College Entrance Exam score; League is the dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the respondent has been the member of some non-profit organizations, like the Red Cross. College includes 
five categories: advance, first-tier, second-tier, third-tier, and vocational; Major includes twelve categories: Philosophy, 









Table 2.6 Tobit Regression of Hours Volunteered 
 on Current Income among First-Tier Colleges 
 
Hours Volunteered (H) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 




















































0.804 -0.658 -0.184 -0.047 -0.450 -0.320 -0.254 -0.120 
 
 




    -3.013 -3.144 -2.923 -3.049 
 
 
    (-1.26) (-1.31) (-1.23) (-1.27) 
















































  1.607 2.632 1.711 2.757 1.579 2.593 
 
 























  3.095 3.257 3.161 3.328 3.198 3.363 
 
 
  (1.37) (1.44) (1.39) (1.46) (1.41) (1.48) 
College No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Major No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.0001 0.001 0.0001 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 
N 1278 1278 1278 1278 1278 1278 1278 1278 1278 1278 
Note: a) t statistics in parentheses 
b) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
c) The standard errors are clustered.  
d) All income variables (household income, monthly consumption and future income) are in thousands. 
e) SNCEE refers to individual i’s Standardized National College Entrance Exam score; League is the dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the respondent has been the member of some non-profit organizations, like the Red Cross. College includes 
five categories: advance, first-tier, second-tier, third-tier, and vocational; Major includes twelve categories: Philosophy, 
Economics, Law, Pedagogy, Arts, History, Science, Engineering, Agronomy, Medicine, Management, and Military. 
 
  




Table 2.7 OLS of Future Income on the Dummy for  
Volunteering and Hours Volunteered among First-Tier Colleges 
 
Log of (Future Income) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 









































































































































College No No Yes Yes 
Major No No Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.000 0.003 0.012 0.014 
N 1278 1278 1278 1278 
Note: a) t statistics in parentheses 
  b) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
c) The standard errors are clustered.  
d) The future income is in thousands. 
e) SNCEE refers to individual i’s Standardized National College Entrance Exam score; League is 
the dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has been the member of some non-profit 
organizations, like the Red Cross. College includes five categories: advance, first-tier, second-
tier, third-tier, and vocational; Major includes twelve categories: Philosophy, Economics, Law, 
Pedagogy, Arts, History, Science, Engineering, Agronomy, Medicine, Management, and Military. 




Figure 2.1 Summary Statistics of the Geographic Residence Information of the Origin of College Students in Shanghai World Expo 2010 in China 
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Form 2.1 The Questionnaire for Volunteers in Shanghai World Expo 2010 in China 
 
Dear volunteer, 
It is our honor to be with you during Shanghai World Expo 2010 in China (SWE). Thank you very much for 
your hard work. Your contribution plays a vital role in the success of SWE.  
As part of a volunteer survey, we are conducting research on the motivations of college students to 
volunteer. We invite you to participate in our research study and hope you can fill the questionnaire according 
to your real situations and thought, which will improve our volunteer management. Whatever related to your 
personal information, we will keep it strictly confidential. Thank you for your support. 
At the end of our survey, there will be a lucky lottery. If you are interested in this lottery, please fill your 
name, phone number and email address in our questionnaire. We will be contacting you if necessary. 





2. Age:            
3. Are you the only child in your family? 
A. Yes 
B. No; please explain the number of your siblings:            
4. What’s the annual income of your family in the year 2010? ￥      
5. What’s your father’s highest level of education completed? 
G. Primary school or below 
H. Junior school 
I. High school/Polytechnic school (Zhong Zhuan) 




6. What’s your mother’s highest level of education completed?  
G. Primary school or below 
H. Junior school 
I. High school/Polytechnic school (Zhong Zhuan) 




7. What’s your monthly expenditure on average in the year 2010? ￥     
8. Have you participated in the National College Entrance Examination (Gaokao)?  
A. Yes 
B. No (Please jump to Q12) 
9. When did you participate in the National College Entrance Examination (Gaokao)? 
Year:             (e.g. 2006) 
10. Where did you participate in the National College Entrance Examination (Gaokao)? 
Province:            (e.g. Guangdong) 
11. What is your National College Entrance Examination (Gaokao) score? 
            (e.g. 630) 
12. Were you a student during May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 2010? 





B. No (Please jump to Q15) 
13. What are your school and major during May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 2010?  
            (e.g. Peking University and Economics) 
14. What is your educational background until April 30th, 2010? 
            (Bachelor, Master, Ph.D. or others); Year:       (e.g. 1) 
15. What is your grade point average (GPA) when you graduated (if not, please fill in the current GPA)?           
(e.g. 3.5 / 5.0) 
16. Have you been a member of any non-profit organizations (e.g. Red Cross) before April 30th, 2010? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
17. Have you shared a room during May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 2010?  
A. Yes 
B. No (Please jump to Q21) 
18. How many roommates did you have during May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 2010?          
19. How many roommates (those who shared the room with you during May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 2010) 
have volunteering experience?          
20. 1) How often did your roommate1 with volunteering experience volunteer during May 1st, 2009, to April 
30th, 2010?           (e.g. 5 ) times;           (e.g. 10)hours 
2) How often did your roommate2 with volunteering experience volunteer during May 1st, 2009, to April 
30th, 2010?           (e.g. 5 ) times;           (e.g. 10)hours 
… 
21. What is the starting date of your volunteering in SWE?  
          (e.g. May 1st, 2010) 
22. What is the ending date of your volunteering in SWE? 
          (e.g. May 1st, 2010) 
23. How long did your volunteering in SWE  last?  
          (e.g. 10) hours 
24. What is your volunteering position in SWE?         (e.g. News Center); 
How many volunteers in the same position?           (e.g. 10)  
25. Have you participated in any other volunteering activities (except the volunteering in SWE) during May 1st, 
2009, to April 30th, 2010? 
A. Yes 
B. No (Please jump to Q29) 
26. How often did you volunteer (the activity in Q25) during May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 2010?  
          (e.g. 5 ) times;           (e.g. 10)hours 
27. What was the largest size of volunteering activity you participated in during May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 
2010? 
A. 1 to 25 volunteers 
B. 26 to 50 volunteers  
C. 51 to 75 volunteers 
D. 76 to 100 volunteers 
E. 101 to 500 volunteers 
F. More than 500 volunteers 
28. What type of the voluntary organization is the largest-size volunteering activity you participated in during 
May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 2010? 
E. Domestic government organization 
F. Domestic NGO 




G. Foreign government organization 
H. Foreign NGO 
29. Read each item carefully. Using the scale below, please mark under the number that best describes the 
reason why you choose to be a volunteer. Answering each item according to the following scale: 1: 
corresponds not at all; 2: corresponds very little; 3: corresponds a little; 4: corresponds moderately; 5: 
corresponds enough; 6: corresponds a lot; 7: corresponds exactly. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Volunteering lets me own a direct experience, exercise 
myself, and get the benefits for my life 
       
I hope I can make a contribution to my country        
I have to help others because I’m more fortunate than them        
I have the awareness of volunteerism as I have been doing 
volunteer services 
       
Inspired by the publicity to recruit volunteer        
It is a good beginning for me to find a job        
My friends volunteer, I follow them        
My school or institute wants me to volunteer        
I can do something for a cause that is important to me        
Voluntary experience will look good on my resume        
Volunteering increases my self-esteem        
Volunteering allows me to explore different career options        
I can learn how to go on well with a variety of people        
I can explore my own strengths        
Volunteering is a way to make new friends        
No matter how bad I have been feeling, volunteering helps 
me to forget it 
       
Volunteering has a positive effect on my jobs or study        
Volunteering helps me work through personal problems        
30. Have you received the Award for the Excellent Volunteer? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
31. Do you have any volunteering experience after October 31st, 2010? 
A. Yes 
B. No (Please jump to Q33) 
32. How often did you volunteer during October 31st, 2010, to October 30th, 2011?  
          (e.g. 5 ) times;           (e.g. 10)hours 
33. What is your current employment status? (if you choose A-C, please jump to Q56) 
A. Not graduated 
B. Graduated, still looking for a job 
C. Graduated, but do not intend to find a job 
D. Waiting to go to work 
E. Working in a private enterprise 
F. Working in a state-owned enterprise 
G. Working in a foreign enterprise 




H. Working in a joint venture enterprise 
I. Working in a government organization or institutions 
J. Unemployment and looking for a new job 
34. When did you start to look for the first job?           (e.g. May, 2006)  
35. When did you receive the first job offer?          (e.g. May, 2006) 
36. How many offers did you receive when you were looking for a job?          (e.g. 6) 
37. When did you receive the current job offer?          (e.g. May, 2006) 
38. Which industry are you working in?  
A. Agriculture, Timber, Livestock Farming, and Fishing 
B. Mining/Oil and Gas 
C. Manufacturing 
D. Electronics, Heating, and Water Production and Supply 
E. Construction 
F. Wholesale/Retail Trade 
G. Transportation, Warehousing and Postal Industry 
H. Accommodation and Restaurants Services 
I. Information Technology/Management 
J. Finance 
K. Real Estate 
L. Rental/Leasing 
M. Scientific and Technical Services 
N. Management of Water Conservancy, Environment and Public Establishment 
O. Residential and Other Services 
P. Education 
Q. Healthcare and Social Work 
R. Culture, Sports and Entertainment 
S. Public Management, Social Security and Social Organization 
T. International Organization 
39. Is there an internship for your first full-time job?  
A. Yes (Please jump to Q46 after answering Q40 to Q43) 
B. No (Please jump to Q44) 
40. When did you start your internship?          (e.g. May, 2006) 
41. What is your monthly salary during your internship?          (e.g. ￥5000) 
42. When did you shift from an intern to an official full-time employee?          (e.g. May, 2006) 
43. What is your monthly salary after becoming an official full-time employee?        (e.g. ￥5000) 
44. When did you start your first full-time job?          (e.g. May, 2006) 
45. What is your monthly salary for your first full-time job?          (e.g. ￥5000) 
46. Do you have a raise in salary after becoming an official full-time employee?  
A. Yes 
B. No (Please jump to Q49) 
47. When did you receive the first raise in salary?          (e.g. May, 2006) 
48. How much was your first salary-raise?          (e.g. ￥500) 
49. Where was your first full-time job located? 
Province:          (e.g. Guangdong); City:           (e.g. Shenzhen)  
50. On average, how many actual working hours per week did you have in your current position? 
A. 1 hour or less 
B. More than 1 hour to 10 hours 
C. More than 10 hours to 20 hours 




D. More than 20 hours to 30 hours 
E. More than 30 hours to 40 hours 
F. More than 40 hours to 50 hours 
G. More than 50 hours 
51. What is your current monthly salary (please jump to Q53 if you have chosen J in Q33)? 
          (e.g. ￥500)  
52. Where is your current job located?  
Province:          (e.g. Guangdong); City:           (e.g. Shenzhen)  
53. What’s your current monthly expenditure on average? 
A. ￥500 or less 
B. More than￥500 to ￥1000 
C. More than￥1000 to ￥1500 
D. More than￥1500 to ￥2000 
E. More than￥2000 to ￥2500 
F. More than￥2500 to ￥3000 
G. More than￥3000 to ￥3500 
H. More than￥3500 to ￥4000 
I. More than￥4000 to ￥4500 
J. More than￥4500 to ￥5000 
K. More than￥5000 
54. What do you think of the influence of your volunteering experience on the chances of getting a job (-3: 
Very negative; -2: Negative; -1: A little negative; 0: Neutral; 1: A little positive; 2: Positive; 3: Very positive)?           
(e.g. 3) 
55. What do you think of the influence of your volunteering experience on the chances of getting a promotion 
(-3: Very negative; -2: Negative; -1: A little negative; 0: Neutral; 1: A little positive; 2: Positive; 3: Very 
positive)?           (e.g. 3) 
56. If you have any opportunity, how often are you going to participate in the volunteering activities in the 
future 12 months?           (e.g. 5 ) times 
57. If you have any opportunity, how long are you going to participate in the volunteering activities in the 
future 12 months?  
A. 0 
B. 10 hours or less 
C. More than 10 hours to 20 hours 
D. More than 20 hours to 30 hours 
E. More than 30 hours to 40 hours 
F. More than 40 hours to 50 hours 
G. More than 50 hours to 60 hours 
H. More than 60 hours to 70 hours 
I. More than 70 hours to 80 hours 
J. More than 80 hours to 90 hours 
K. More than 90 hours to 100 hours 
L. More than 100 hours 
58. At the end of our survey, there will be a lucky lottery. If you are interested in this lottery, please fill in your 
name, phone number and email address here. We will be contacting you if necessary.  
Name:          
Tel:          
Email:          
  





Form 2.2 The Questionnaire for Sample in RenDa Economics Forum 
 
Dear friend, 
As part of a volunteer survey, we are conducting research on the motivations of college students to 
volunteer. We invite you to participate in our research study and hope you can fill the questionnaire according 
to your real situations and thought, which will improve our volunteer management. Whatever related to your 
personal information, we will keep it strictly confidential. Thank you for your support. 
At the end of our survey, there will be a lucky lottery. If you are interested in this lottery, please fill your 





2. Age:            
3. Are you the only child in your family? 
A. Yes 
B. No; please explain the number of your siblings:            
4. What’s the annual income of your family in the year 2010? ￥      
5. What’s your father’s highest level of education completed? 
A. Primary school or below 
B. Junior school 
C. High school/Polytechnic school (Zhong Zhuan) 




6. What’s your mother’s highest level of education completed?  
A. Primary school or below 
B. Junior school 
C. High school/Polytechnic school (Zhong Zhuan) 




7. What’s your monthly expenditure on average in the year 2010? ￥     
8. Have you participated in the National College Entrance Examination (Gaokao)?  
A. Yes 
B. No (Please jump to Q12) 
9. When did you participate in the National College Entrance Examination (Gaokao)? 
Year:            (e.g. 2006) 
10. Where did you participate in the National College Entrance Examination (Gaokao)? 
Province:            (e.g. Guangdong) 
11. What is your National College Entrance Examination (Gaokao) score? 
            (e.g. 630) 
12. Were you a student during May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 2010? 
A. Yes 
B. No (Please jump to Q15) 




13. What are your school and major during May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 2010?  
            (e.g. Peking University and Economics) 
14. What is your educational background until April 30th, 2010? 
            (Bachelor, Master, Ph.D. or others); Year:       (e.g. 1) 
15. What is your grade point average (GPA) when you graduated (if not, please fill in the current GPA)?           
(e.g. 3.5 / 5.0) 
16. Have you been a member of any non-profit organizations (e.g. Red Cross) before April 30th, 2010?  
A. Yes 
B. No 
17. Have you shared a room during May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 2010?  
A. Yes 
B. No (Please jump to Q21) 
18. How many roommates did you have during May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 2010?          
19. How many roommates (those who shared the room with you during May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 2010) 
have volunteering experience?          
20. 1) How often did your roommate1 with volunteering experience volunteer during May 1st, 2009, to April 
30th, 2010?           (e.g. 5 ) times;           (e.g. 10)hours 
2) How often did your roommate2 with volunteering experience volunteer during May 1st, 2009, to April 
30th, 2010?           (e.g. 5 ) times;           (e.g. 10)hours 
… 
21. Have you participated in any volunteering during May 1st, 2010, to October 31st, 2010? 
A. Yes 
B. No (Please jump to Q23) 
22. How often did you volunteer during May 1st, 2010, to October 31st, 2010?  
          (e.g. 5 ) times;           (e.g. 10)hours 
23. Have you participated in any volunteering during May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 2010? 
A. Yes 
B. No (Please jump to Q28) 
24. How often did you volunteer during May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 2010?  
          (e.g. 5 ) times;           (e.g. 10)hours 
25. What was the largest size of volunteering activity you participated in during May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 
2010? 
A. 1 to 25 volunteers 
B. 26 to 50 volunteers 
C. 51 to 75 volunteers 
D. 76 to 100 volunteers 
E. 101 to 500 volunteers 
F. More than 500 volunteers 
26. What type of the voluntary organization is the largest-size volunteering activity you participated in during 
May 1st, 2009, to April 30th, 2010? 
A. Domestic government organization 
B. Domestic NGO 
C. Foreign government organization 
D. Foreign NGO 
27. Read each item carefully. Using the scale below, please mark under the number that best describes the 
reason why you choose to be a volunteer. Answering each item according to the following scale: 1: 
corresponds not at all; 2: corresponds very little; 3: corresponds a little; 4: corresponds moderately; 5: 
corresponds enough; 6: corresponds a lot; 7: corresponds exactly. 




 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Volunteering lets me own a direct experience, exercise 
myself, and get the benefits for my life 
       
I hope I can make a contribution to my country        
I have to help others because I’m more fortunate than them        
I have the awareness of volunteerism as I have been doing 
volunteer services 
       
Inspired by the publicity to recruit volunteer        
It is a good beginning for me to find a job        
My friends volunteer, I follow them        
My school or institute wants me to volunteer        
I can do something for a cause that is important to me        
Voluntary experience will look good on my resume        
Volunteering increases my self-esteem        
Volunteering allows me to explore different career options        
I can learn how to go on well with a variety of people        
I can explore my own strengths        
Volunteering is a way to make new friends        
No matter how bad I have been feeling, volunteering helps 
me to forget it 
       
Volunteering has a positive effect on my jobs or study        
Volunteering helps me work through personal problems        
28. Do you have any volunteering experience after October 31st, 2010? 
A. Yes 
B. No (Please jump to Q30) 
29. How often did you volunteer during October 31st, 2010, to October 30th, 2011?  
          (e.g. 5 ) times;           (e.g. 10)hours 
30. What is your current employment status? (if you choose A-C, please jump to Q53) 
A. Not graduated 
B. Graduated, still looking for a job 
C. Graduated, but do not intend to find a job 
D. Waiting to go to work 
E. Working in a private enterprise 
F. Working in a state-owned enterprise 
G. Working in a foreign enterprise 
H. Working in a joint venture enterprise 
I. Working in a government institutions 
J. Unemployment and looking for a new job 
31. When did you start to look for the first job?           (e.g. May, 2006)  
32. When did you receive the first job offer?          (e.g. May, 2006) 
33. How many offers did you receive when you were looking for a job?          (e.g. 6) 
34. When did you receive the current job offer?          (e.g. May, 2006) 
35. Which industry are you working in?  
A. Agriculture, Timber, Livestock Farming, and Fishing 




B. Mining/Oil and Gas 
C. Manufacturing 
D. Electronics, Heating, and Water Production and Supply 
E. Construction 
F. Wholesale/Retail Trade 
G. Transportation, Warehousing and Postal Industry 
H. Accommodation and Restaurants Services 
I. Information Technology/Management 
J. Finance 
K. Real Estate 
L. Rental/Leasing 
M. Scientific and Technical Services 
N. Management of Water Conservancy, Environment and Public Establishment 
O. Residential and Other Services 
P. Education 
Q. Healthcare and Social Work 
R. Culture, Sports and Entertainment 
S. Public Management, Social Security and Social Organization 
T. International Organization 
36. Is there an internship for your first full-time job?  
A. Yes (Please jump to Q43 after answering Q37 to Q40) 
B. No (Please jump to Q41) 
37. When did you start your internship?          (e.g. May, 2006) 
38. What is your monthly salary during your internship?          (e.g. ￥5000) 
39. When did you shift from an intern to an official full-time employee?          (e.g. May, 2006) 
40. What is your monthly salary after becoming an official full-time employee?        (e.g. ￥5000) 
41. When did you start your first full-time job?          (e.g. May, 2006) 
42. What is your monthly salary for your first full-time job?          (e.g. ￥5000) 
43. Do you have a raise in salary after becoming an official full-time employee?  
A. Yes 
B. No (Please jump to Q46) 
44. When did you receive the first raise in salary?          (e.g. May, 2006) 
45. How much was your first salary-raise?          (e.g. ￥500) 
46. Where was your first full-time job located? 
Province:          (e.g. Guangdong); City:           (e.g. Shenzhen)  
47. On average, how many actual working hours per week did you have in your current position? 
A. 1 hour or less 
B. More than 1 hour to 10 hours 
C. More than 10 hours to 20 hours 
D. More than 20 hours to 30 hours 
E. More than 30 hours to 40 hours 
F. More than 40 hours to 50 hours 
G. More than 50 hours 
48. What is your current monthly salary (please jump to Q51 if you have chosen J in Q30)? 
          (e.g. ￥500)  
49. Where is your current job located?  
Province:          (e.g. Guangdong); City:           (e.g. Shenzhen)  
50. What’s your current monthly expenditure on average? 




A. ￥500 or less 
B. More than￥500 to ￥1000 
C. More than￥1000 to ￥1500 
D. More than￥1500 to ￥2000 
E. More than￥2000 to ￥2500 
F. More than￥2500 to ￥3000 
G. More than￥3000 to ￥3500 
H. More than￥3500 to ￥4000 
I. More than￥4000 to ￥4500 
J. More than￥4500 to ￥5000 
K. More than￥5000 
51. What do you think of the influence of your volunteering experience on the chances of getting a job (-3: 
Very negative; -2: Negative; -1: A little negative; 0: Neutral; 1: A little positive; 2: Positive; 3: Very positive)?           
(e.g. 3) 
52. What do you think of the influence of your volunteering experience on the chances of getting a promotion 
(-3: Very negative; -2: Negative; -1: A little negative; 0: Neutral; 1: A little positive; 2: Positive; 3: Very 
positive)?           (e.g. 3) 
53. If you have any opportunity, how often are you going to participate in the volunteering activities in the 
future 12 months?           (e.g. 5 ) times 
54. If you have any opportunity, how long are you going to participate in the volunteering activities in the 
future 12 months?  
A. 0 
B. 10 hours or less 
C. More than 10 hours to 20 hours 
D. More than 20 hours to 30 hours 
E. More than 30 hours to 40 hours 
F. More than 40 hours to 50 hours 
G. More than 50 hours to 60 hours 
H. More than 60 hours to 70 hours 
I. More than 70 hours to 80 hours 
J. More than 80 hours to 90 hours 
K. More than 90 hours to 100 hours 
L. More than 100 hours 
55. At the end of our survey, there will be a lucky lottery. If you are interested in this lottery, please fill in your 
name, phone number and email address here. We will be contacting you if necessary.  
Name:          
Tel:          
Email:          
 
  





How Immigration Reduced Social Capital in the U.S.: 2005-2011 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Social capital is considered to have decreased in the U.S. since the 1960s. For instance, Putnam 
(1995) shows that membership of organizations such as the PTA and Red Cross dropped by 25% 
between the 1960s and the 1990s, while Costa and Kahn (2001) find that the proportion of 
individuals that volunteer declined from 29% in 1974 to 26% in 1989. Putnam (1995) 
hypothesizes that the decline in social capital could be caused by the increased mobility of 
American workers, but fails to show causality, as pointed out by Durlauf (2002a, 2002b). 
However, DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) do show that expected mobility reduces social capital 
by finding that American homeowners are more likely to participate in local activities. Similarly 
Glaeser et al. (2002) find a strong negative relationship between predicted levels of mobility and 
the organizational membership of American individuals. 
Other authors have pointed out the role of community heterogeneity in explaining social 
capital trends. For instance, Alesina and LaFerrara (2000) find that social participation, measured 
as group membership, is lower in neighborhoods where inequality is higher and there is larger 
racial and ethnic fragmentation. Similarly, Costa and Kahn (2001) demonstrate that community 
heterogeneity, measured by income inequality as well as racial and birthplace fragmentation, 
reduces the likelihood of volunteering. 
However, this research stream focuses on the correlation between community heterogeneity 
and social capital and does not attempt to address that the racial and even income composition of 
communities is endogenous, as people sort themselves into the communities they live in. The 




only exception is the study by Charles and Kline (2006), which finds that people are less likely to 
carpool in communities that display larger racial fragmentation, correcting for the potential 
endogeneity of the racial composition of an individual’s neighborhood by using the racial 
fragmentation of the state and year in which the individual was born. 
Moreover, significantly fewer studies have explored the causal relationship between 
immigration and social capital despite the large inflow of immigrants over the past 50 years, with 
the share of foreign-born individuals in the U.S. rising from 5.4% in 1960 (Borjas et al. 1997) to 
14% in 2000 (Borjas and Katz 2007). LeSage and Ha (2012) find a positive relationship between 
in-migration and social capital in U.S. states and a negative relationship between out-migration 
and social capital. Kawashima-Ginsberg and Kirby (2009) focus on the volunteering patterns of 
the children of foreign-born individuals and find no difference compared with those of U.S.-born 
individuals. Kanas et al. (2012) find that social capital, measured by social contacts, improves the 
occupational status and wages of immigrants, while Handy and Greenspan (2009) show that 
volunteering improves individual integration in the receiving community by enhancing the 
human capital as well as the ability of migrants to understand the culture and social norms of the 
host country. Finally, Behtoui and Neergaard (2010) find that immigrants in Sweden have little 
access to social capital networks. 
In this paper, we examine the degree to which rising immigration since the 1960s has 
contributed to the reduction in social capital in the U.S.. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study that has explored how local residents change their social capital investment decisions 
in response to the increased heterogeneity in their communities because of the inflow of foreign-
born individuals. 
Since social capital cannot be observed directly, a commonly used proxy is trust, as measured 




by a question such as ―Would you say that most people can be trusted?‖ However, this self-
reported belief about the local community may not reflect the actual behavior of individuals. For 
example, Glaeser et al. (2000) show that people that report being more trusting do not actually 
show more trust in standard trust games. Another commonly used proxy is organizational 
membership (see Putnam 1995). However, organizational membership does not imply that 
members interact (Charles and Kline 2006), while active community participation is more 
important to the construction of social capital than group membership (Putnam 2000; Beyerlein 
and Hipp 2006).  
In contrast to previous studies, we focus on volunteering, an important form of community 
participation that captures engagement in a social activity in which individuals interact (Bekkers 
2005). Although volunteering has typically been used to examine altruistic behavior (Brekke et al. 
2003), it shares many of the characteristics of other social capital proxies. 
We collect data from the September Volunteer Supplement of the Current Population Survey 
(the CPS September sample hereafter) between 2005 and 2011 and show that a 10% increase in 
the proportion of foreign-born individuals reduces the likelihood of U.S.-born individuals 
volunteering by 0.68–0.83 percentage points and the number of hours volunteered by 0.25%. We 
also show that these results hold true both at the aggregate level, which includes all possible 
externalities from social capital, as well as at the individual level. 
One major methodological concern is the endogeneity of migration flows, as immigrants may 
choose to move to states that have higher social capital (Massey and Aysa-Lastra 2011), biasing 
the results downwards. We address this issue by using the supply-push instrumental variable 
(SPIV) commonly used in the immigration literature (Card 2001; Peri 2011; Wozniak and Murray 
2012). Our IV estimates show that a 10% increase in the proportion of foreign-born individuals 




reduces the likelihood of U.S.-born individuals volunteering by 4–6 percentage points and the 
number of hours volunteered by 1–2%, although this last result is still not statistically significant. 
We also show in our robustness check that this result is not driven solely by the increased racial 
fragmentation in the receiving community. 
In summary, our paper contributes to both the literature on social capital and the literature on 
migration in three main ways. First, we explore a novel dataset on volunteering and show that 
volunteering behavior shares the same characteristics as other types of social capital investments. 
Second, we show that immigration influences receiving communities by reducing social capital 
investment, because it increases heterogeneity beyond racial fragmentation. Finally, we argue that 
the negative relationship between heterogeneity and social capital is causal. 
Given the importance of social capital for the acquisition of skills and human capital (Loury 
1977), economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1997), government efficiency and mitigating 
corruption (LaPorta et al. 1997), and financial development (Guiso et al. 2000), our results 
provide valuable insights for public policy. They show that immigration has a negative impact on 
social capital investment in receiving communities and therefore that this influencing factor 
should be taken into consideration in immigration laws. In particular, future research should 
focus on the trade-off between the benefits of immigration (e.g. the inflow of high-skilled 
workers) and the costs of reducing social capital. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we present our theoretical 
framework, in section 3.3 we describe the data used herein, and in section 3.4 we show our 
empirical strategy and present our results. We verify our results with a robustness check in 
section 3.5 and the conclusion is in section 3.6. 
 




3.2 Theoretical Framework 
One of the main criticisms of Putnam’s (1995) groundbreaking work on social capital is the lack 
of a conceptual model for its formation (see Durlauf 2002a). One noticeable exception is the 
work of Glaeser et al. (2002), which explores the autonomous motivations for social capital 
investment. The authors see social capital as able to be accumulated until the marginal benefit of 
an extra unit of such capital is equal to its marginal cost. Further, they state that the determinants 
of social capital include the characteristics of both individual investors and the community in 
which they reside. 
By employing a similar framework, Charles and Kline (2006) examine the relational costs of 
social capital investment. In their model, the amount of social capital that an individual decides to 
accumulate also depends on its marginal benefit and cost, although in their case these costs 
depend not on the characteristics of individual investors, but on those of the individual with 
whom you must interact in order to generate social capital. The theoretical framework proposed 
in this paper is based on Charles and Kline’s (2006) model and we assume that the cost of 
investing in social capital with foreign-born individuals is higher than that of generating social 
capital with U.S.-born individuals. 
In the presented model, social capital investment requires that two individuals interact in an 
activity such as volunteering. In this volunteering activity, individual i forms social capital, sij>0, 
through his/her interaction with individual j. As in the approach taken by Charles and Kline 
(2006), all social capital is derived from this pair-wise connection. Therefore, we can measure the 
social capital that individual i has in a particular state, R, as the sum of all the connections he or 





 sij, with j∈R. 




Consider now a one-time decision to allocate one unit of time between two activities: 
investing in social capital by volunteering, tv, or engaging in an alternative productive activity 
such as working or a family gathering, ta=1−tv. Assume, without loss of generality, that the 
returns to both activities are the same, while the cost of investing in the alternative activity is a 
convex function fa(ta) and the cost of investing in social capital is also a convex function of the 
relational cost of interacting with other people, C(tv). Relational costs, however, depend on how 
similar other individuals are to you. The more dissimilar the two individuals attempting to form a 
relationship that generates social capital, the higher is the cost. The migration literature has found 
that foreign-born individuals are substantially different from local residents, not only in terms of 
observable characteristics such as education and experience (see Borjas 2003; Ottaviano and Peri 
2008), but also in terms of unobservable characteristics (Borjas 1987). Therefore, it is reasonable 
to assume that the marginal relational cost for a U.S.-born individual, n, is higher if he or she 








Therefore, a U.S.-born individual will allocate his or her time between volunteering and the 
alternative activity until the marginal net benefit of each activity is equal; however, since the 












where αn and αfb represent the probability of engaging through volunteering with a U.S.-born 
and a foreign-born individual, respectively, with αn+αfb=1. We can thus measure the probability 




of meeting a foreign-born individual by assessing the proportion of foreign-born individuals that 
reside in the community. 
















(tv). Therefore, time spent 
volunteering will change in response to an increase in the proportion of foreign-born individuals 








































(tv)>0, as long as the denominator is positive
11
, an increase in the proportion 
of foreign-born individuals leads to a reduction in the amount of time U.S.-born individuals 
spend investing in social capital. Therefore, under these reasonable assumptions, an increase in 
the proportion of foreign-born individuals in the community will lead to a decrease in the time 
U.S.-born individuals spend volunteering. 
 
3.3 Social Capital and Immigration in the U.S. between 2004 and 2011 
The CPS currently interviews 72,000 households, with each household part of the sample for 4 
months, followed by 8 months off, and another 4 months in the sample. Hence, 75% of the 
households are the same on a month-to-month basis and 50% are the same from year to year
12
. 
The CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement conducted in March collects valuable 
information on income and this is the more commonly used sample in labor economics 
(information on wages is often missing in the other months of the CPS). 
                                                            
11 If the cost functions have a positive third derivative, then the denominator is negative, making the denominator positive, 
although for some negative values of the third derivative of the cost functions, the denominator could still be negative. 
12 See the BLS website, http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/homch1_f.htm, for more information on sampling. 




Because we use lagged variables, the sample examined herein runs from 2004 to 2011 for two 
main reasons. First, in 2003, the CPS changed its race and ethnicity classifications to match those 
of the Census
13
. Second, the CPS September sample, which collects information on volunteering 
through organizations as well as other activities carried out by individuals infrequently or 
activities that involve volunteer work for children’s schools or youth organizations (see Table 3.1), 
started to be gathered in 2002. As shown in Table 3.2, the percentage of U.S.-born individuals 
between the ages of 16 and 60 that reported volunteering dropped from 3.4% in 2005 to 3% in 
2011. Moreover, for those that did report volunteering, the number of hours spent doing so 
dropped from 3.8 hours per week in 2005 to 0.96 hours per week in 2011 (the averages for this 
time period are reported in Table 3.2). 
Compared with other surveys, the CPS reports much lower values. For instance, between 
1974 and 1998, the proportion of people aged 16–54 that had volunteered in the previous year 
was 53% according to the DDB Needham Life Style Survey and the Gallup Giving and 
Volunteering in the United States Survey and just 6% as reported by NPD Group Time Study 
Data (see Costa and Kahn 2001). The differences in volunteering figures across these surveys can 
be partially explained by respondents’ self-selection. Abraham et al. (2008), for example, find 
that CPS respondents that participate in the American Time Use Survey are much more likely to 
report volunteering than those in the CPS September sample. 
While only 49.4% of the U.S.-born individuals in our sample are women (Table 3.2), they 
account for 63.3% of those that report volunteering (Table 3.3), consistent with the findings of 
Norris and Inglehart (2005). The volunteers in our sample are also more likely to be married 
(63.6% of volunteers vs. 50.7% in our sample; Tables 3.3 and 3.2 respectively) and more likely to 
                                                            
13 See the BLS website http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/homch1_e.htm,for recent changes to CPS surveys. 




have children (61.8% of volunteers vs. 30.2% in our sample). We find that volunteers have a 
similar racial distribution to that of the overall U.S. population (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3) and that 
individuals that have higher levels of education are more likely to volunteer (44.3% of volunteers 
have a degree compared with 30.6% in our sample). Note that the number of people that report 
their income is very low (6.9% of respondents). This is a known problem with the CPS 
September sample. 
Immigrants are different to U.S.-born individuals on all dimensions except household income. 
One-fifth (21.1%) of immigrants are white, with 45.3% Hispanic, 8% black, and 22.5% of Asian 
origin (Table 3.4). In our sample of respondents aged 16–60, the proportion that were foreign-
born rose from 15.9% in 2005 to 17.4% in 2011 (average over our sample period is 15.7%; Table 
3.4). We also find that while immigrants have a lower propensity to volunteer (Table 3.4), in 
contrast to the general population, there has been an increase over time, from 1.5% in 2005 to 2.5% 
in 2011. 
In terms of observable characteristics, compared with U.S. born individuals, immigrants have 
lower educational levels, are younger on average, have lower wages, and are more likely to be 
women and married. From the perspective of unobservable characteristics, Ottaviano and Peri 
(2012) find that immigrants with the same education and experience are imperfect substitutes in 
production, which is consistent with the findings of Duleep and Regets (1999) that immigrants’ 
education acquired in their home country is not fully valued in the destination country
14
. Borjas 
(1987) also argues that immigrants’ performance in the U.S. depends on how their unobservable 
skills are different from those of U.S.-born individuals. 
We conduct our analysis at three levels: Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), state, and 
                                                            
14 This is the same effect you would see if quality of education abroad were lower than education in the US. 




individual. Our state sample contains 50 states and Washington DC, while the MSA sample 
contains 135 cities. We use information about the county of residence drawn from the CPS in 
order to identify the MSAs. The individual-level sample is used to calculate income inequality, 
measured by the Gini coefficient, and racial fragmentation, using the same measure as Alesina 





, where k is the race 
category (whites, Hispanic, blacks, Asian, and other) and pik is the share of race k in either state 
or MSA i. While the values of the Gini coefficient in our sample are consistent with those 
reported by Alesina and LaFerrara (2000) and Costa and Kahn (2001), our racial fragmentation is 
twice as large that reported by these authors, because we treat whites and Hispanics as two 
separate racial groups. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
In section 3.2, we found a negative relationship between social capital investment and the 
proportion of foreign-born individuals that live in a community. However, our proposed model 
does not provide a closed-form relationship between these two variables. Therefore, we focus on 
the reduced-form relationships between social capital investment, particularly volunteering and 
hours volunteered, and immigration, measured by the change in the proportion of foreign-born 
individuals according to the following equation: 
ΔSCijt=α+β1ΔImmigit+β2Xijt+γi+δt+εijt (3.3) 
where ΔSCijt represents social capital investment, proxied by volunteering and hours volunteered, 
by U.S.-born individuals between the ages of 16 and 60, j, in area i in year t. ΔImmigit is the 




change in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in area i in year t and Xijt is a set of controls 
for area characteristics (income inequality and racial fragmentation) and individual- and 
household-level characteristics for our individual-level regressions (income, age, education, 
household size and income, race). γi are the area fixed effects (either state or MSA, depending on 
the specification) and δt are a set of year dummies. 
In essence, we compare the volunteering behavior of U.S.-born individuals in response to the 
inflow of foreign-born individuals across states or MSAs (depending on the specification). In 
particular, we aim to determine whether areas in which immigration has increased the fastest 
(treatment group) are also areas in which social capital investment has decreased the most. If 
immigrants were to pick their destinations in a random fashion, we could interpret our estimates 
of β1 as representing the local average treatment effects. However, it is unlikely that migrants 
pick their destinations randomly. Therefore, we address the potential bias from immigrants self-
selecting different locations by using the SPIV. Previous authors have pointed out the importance 
of measuring social capital at the aggregate level in order to capture all associated externalities 
(see Norris and Inglehart 2005; Guiso et al. 2011). Therefore, we begin by examining the 
correlation between social capital and immigration at the aggregate level, by using an area 
approach. 
 
3.4.1 Area Approach 
First, we estimate Equation 3.3 in which we aggregate social capital investment at the MSA level. 
Our results are presented in Table 3.5. We estimate a linear probability model for volunteering in 
columns 1 and 2, where the dependent variable is the volunteer rate (i.e., proportion of 




individuals that volunteer). In column 1, the change in the proportion of foreign-born people has 
a positive but not statistically significant impact on the likelihood of U.S. citizens volunteering. 
The same finding holds true in column 2 when we include the MSA characteristics, Gini index, 
and index of racial fragmentation. 
Second, we estimate a Poisson model in order to assess time spent volunteering (columns 3 
and 4), where the dependent variable is the log of the total number of hours volunteered. We find 
that while an increase in the proportion of foreign-born people decreases the number of hours that 
individuals volunteer as expected, this result is not statistically significant in either model (with 
controls for the MSA characteristics in column 3 and without these controls in column 4). 
These results could be biased downwards if U.S.-born individuals that have low levels of 
social capital responded to the inflow of immigrants by moving to another MSA within their 
current states of residence (see Borjas 2003; Wozniak and Murray 2012). We can correct for this 
crowding out effect by aggregating our data at the state level, which would represent the 
outcomes of those U.S.-born individuals displaced. Therefore, we run the same regressions as 
before but with data aggregated at the state level
15
. The results of the linear probability model for 
volunteering in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.6 now show a negative correlation between the 
change in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in the state and the probability of 
volunteering, although this is still not statistically significant. Further, the Poisson model for the 
number of hours volunteered in columns 3 and 4 shows that a 1% increase in the proportion of 
foreign-born people at the state level leads to a 22–24% reduction in the number of hours spent 
volunteering (this is not statistically significant). 
However, these results could still be biased towards zero because of the self-selection of 
                                                            
15 Technically, we should continue aggregating to the national level, but this would reduce our sample to six observations. 




immigrants in different states. As pointed out by Aguilera and Massey (2003) and Kanas et al. 
(2012), immigrants that establish a greater number of community connections or social contacts 
in their receiving communities earn higher wages. Therefore, places where people volunteer more 
often might also be where immigrants are likely to establish more connections in order to earn 
higher wages. This argument suggests that new immigrants may be likely to decide to move to 
states that have seen an increase in social capital investment (i.e., higher volunteering rates). As a 
result, any increase in social capital investment by U.S. citizens would attract more foreign-born 
individuals, reducing social capital investment and thus biasing our estimates of β1 downwards. 
Therefore in order to isolate supply-push factors from demand-pull factors, we construct our 
SPIV in the next subsection. 
 
3.4.2 IV formulation 
In this subsection, we follow Card (2001), Peri (2011), and Wozniak and Murray (2012) in order 
to construct our SPIV. Specifically, we decompose the change in the proportion of foreign-born 
people into two decisions: (i) the decision to migrate to the U.S. and (ii) the decision of where to 











where γi corresponds to the pattern of recent immigrant settlement across U.S. states, i, and 
D Migrationt Populationt( ) is the change in the fraction of foreign born in year t. 
As in previous studies, the validity of our instrument relies on two assumptions. First, we 
assume that immigrants choose to come to the U.S. in response to changes in the economic 




situations in their countries of origin rather than to changes in social capital investment in the 
U.S.. Second, we assume that changes in social capital investment or volunteering across U.S. 
states only affect the pattern of immigrant settlement, γi. Therefore, we use the 2000 population 
Census from Ruggles et al. (2010) in order to measure γi, the share of foreign-born individuals in 
each state relative to the total number of foreign-born individuals that live in the U.S.. Under 
these standard assumptions, our SPIV will be uncorrelated with current changes in social capital 
investment in the U.S.
16
. 
Our results are reported in Table 3.7. In the upper section of this table, we report the second-
stage results, while the first-stage results are presented in the lower section. When we use the 
SPIV as our IV, changes in the proportion of foreign-born people have a negative and statistically 
significant impact on the probability of volunteering (see columns 1 and 2). In particular, a 10% 
increase in the proportion of foreign-born individuals leads to a 5 to 6 percentage point decrease 
in the probability of U.S.-born individuals volunteering. This result holds true regardless of 
whether we include controls for state characteristics (column 2) or not (column 1). 
Further, our first-stage results show that the SPIV is correlated with changes in the proportion 
of foreign-born individuals, with an F-statistic above 10 in all specifications. According to the 
hours volunteered reported in columns 3 and 4, changes in the proportion of foreign-born 
individuals have a negative impact on the number of hours volunteered but this is no longer 
statistically significant. Therefore, immigration leads to a decrease in the number of U.S.-born 
individuals that volunteer, but this effect could be compensated by an increase in the number of 
hours each remaining volunteer dedicates to volunteering. 
                                                            
16 Migration flows may still respond to long-term trends in social capital investment in the US. However, state and year dummies 
control for long-term trends and short-term common shocks in social capital across states and years. 





3.4.3 Individual-level Results 
As pointed out by Glaeser et al. (2002), aggregate behavior may not reflect individual behavior 
because of omitted variable bias. Therefore, we repeat our analysis at the individual level to 
reassess the probability of volunteering
17
 and the log of total hours spent volunteering and then 
examine their correlations with the change in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in a 
particular state. 
We use a similar model to that employed by Alesina and LaFerrara (2000) and Glaeser et al. 
(2002) as our base model, in which we control for the individual characteristics, household 
characteristics, and state characteristics of U.S.-born individuals
18
. Our results for the base model 
presented in Tables 3.8 to 3.11 are generally consistent with those of Alesina and LaFerrara (2000) 
and Glaeser et al. (2002), indicating that volunteering is influenced by individual-, household-, 
and state-level characteristics in a fashion similar to other types of social capital. 
Table 3.8 shows that an increase in income has a positive and statistically significant impact 
on both the probability of volunteering and the number of hours volunteered, inconsistent with 
theory, but consistent with previous results in the social capital literature (see Alesina and 
LaFerrara 2000; Glaeser et al. 2002). Being a full-time worker has a negative impact in both 
models, although only statistically significant for the probability of volunteering. Further, overall, 
the level of volunteering increases with education level
19
 and this relationship is statistically 
significant, concurring with theory as well as the results presented by Helliwell and Putnam 
(2007) and Glaeser et al. (2002). 
                                                            
17 Since it is not possible to obtain unconditional marginal probabilities from a probit model with fixed effects and the calculations 
for an IV logit with fixed effects are computationally cumbersome, we use the linear probability model in this section. 
18 If we were to include in our sample foreign-born individuals, our results would be similar. 
19 With the exception of the probability of high school graduates volunteering. 




The relationship between age and volunteering (Table 3.9) is an inverted U-shape consistent 
with the findings of Putnam (2000) and Glaeser et al. (2002). Volunteering increases from the age 
of 20 and peaks between 40 and 44 before slowly beginning to decline. Table 3.10, which 
includes the remaining individual-level characteristics, shows that having children 3 years or 
older increases the likelihood of investing in social capital and that married people are 
significantly more likely to volunteer
20
, consistent with the results of Alesina and LaFerrara 
(2000). In contrast to the findings of Alesina and LaFerrara (2000) and Glaeser et al. (2002), we 
find that women are more likely to volunteer. However, our results are consistent with the 
theoretical model, as people with higher returns to social capital investment, such as those that 
work in the services sector, are more likely to invest in this way (Glaeser et al. 2002). Therefore, 
since the proportion of women that work in the services sector in the U.S. is significantly higher 
than the proportion of men, we would expect women to be more likely to invest in social capital 
and therefore volunteer, consistent with the findings of Costa and Kahn (2001). 
Table 3.11 shows that volunteering responds to household characteristics in the same fashion 
as other types of social capital. In particular, we find that larger households are less likely to 
volunteer and that household income has an inverted U-shaped relationship with household 
income, consistent with the findings of Alesina and LaFerrara (2000). 
Finally, when it comes to the state characteristics in Table 3.11, we see that inequality, 
proxied by the Gini coefficient, has a negative impact on volunteering (although only statistically 
significant for hours volunteered), consistent with the findings of Alesina and LaFerrara (2000) 
and Glaeser et al. (2002). Racial fragmentation, however, is not statistically significant in either 
specification (it has a negative impact on the likelihood of volunteering and a positive effect on 
                                                            
20 However, this result for hours volunteered is not statistically significant. 




the number of hours volunteered). 
In summary, our results are generally consistent with those found by previous authors for 
different types of social capital. Therefore, we argue that volunteering can be modeled as another 
type of social capital. In the following regressions, we focus on how U.S.-born people react to the 
inflow of immigrants. We add individual, household, and state characteristics in the different 
specifications and while we omit the results for these variables, they largely remain unchanged. 
First, the individual-level results of the relationship between the probability of volunteering 
and changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in the state are reported in columns 1 to 
4 of Table 3.12. In column 1, we include only basic controls for time, state, and race, while in 
column 2, we include individual controls, to which we add household controls in column 3 and 
state controls in column 4. In all these specifications, a 10% increase in the proportion of foreign-
born individuals leads to a statistically significant 0.7–0.8 percentage point decrease in the 
likelihood of volunteering. This result is consistent with the conclusion drawn from our 
theoretical model in section 3.2, where an increase in the proportion of foreign-born individuals 
reduces social capital investment. Likewise, having more U.S.-born individuals at the state-level 
leads to more volunteering (significant) and having more foreign-born individuals to less (not 
significant). Our results for the log number of hours volunteered in columns 5 to 8 of Table 3.12, 
(where we include more controls in each column) are also largely consistent with the probability 
of volunteering. A 10% increase in the proportion of foreign-born individuals leads to a 0.075–
0.25% increase in the number of hours volunteered, although these results are not statistically 
significant. 
For the same reasons as before, we again construct an IV that is uncorrelated with changes in 
social capital in the destination. In terms of the probability of volunteering, the first-stage results 




reported in columns 1 to 4 in the lower part of Table 3.13 show that our SPIV is strongly 
correlated with our endogenous variable, the change in the proportion of foreign-born individuals, 
with an F-test result above 10. Our second-stage results are presented in the upper half of the 
same table. As expected, our IV results show that an increase in the proportion of foreign-born 
individuals leads to a larger decrease in the probability of volunteering compared with our OLS 
results. In particular, a 10% increase in the proportion of foreign-born people leads to a 
statistically significant 4–6 percentage point decrease in the probability of volunteering, 
consistent with our theoretical model. We also find that states that have more U.S.-born (foreign-
born) individuals have a significantly higher (lower) social capital investment, consistent with 
our model. 
The results for the number of hours volunteered in columns 5 to 8 of Table 3.13 are also 
consistent with our theoretical model but generally not statistically significant. In particular, a 10% 
increase in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in the state leads to a 1–2% decrease in the 
number of hours volunteered. In fact, only the number of foreign-born individuals in the state has 
a negative and statistically significant (at the 10% level) impact on the number of hours 
volunteered by U.S.-born individuals, consistent with the model. Therefore, we can argue that an 
increase in the proportion of foreign-born individuals leads to a significantly negative impact on 
the probability of U.S.-born individuals volunteering. However, this reduction could be 
compensated by existing volunteers spending more time volunteering, because we find no 
statistically significant impact of immigration on hours volunteered, a measure of both the 
intensive and the extensive margin. 
3.5 Robustness Check 
One concern is that the presented results capture changes in the racial composition of the local 




population, which previous authors have found to be important for explaining changes in social 
capital, as opposed to changes in other unobservable characteristics in the receiving community. 
Therefore, we divide migration flows by race in order to determine whether changes in the 
number of immigrants of a particular race affect the volunteering decisions of U.S.-born 
individuals of the same race. 
Our OLS results are presented in Table 3.14. In columns 1 to 4, we estimate the linear 
probability model for volunteering, adding progressively more controls for individual, household, 
and state characteristics, while in columns 5 to 8 we estimate the Poisson model for the number 
of hours volunteered. Our results show that an increase in the share of foreign-born people, either 
own race or other races, does not have a statistically significant impact on either the likelihood of 
volunteering or the number of hours volunteered. 
We address the problem of endogeneity by using a SPIV for immigrants of the same race and 
immigrants of different races. Our first-stage results are presented in Table 3.15; there is no 
evidence of weak instruments, as our F-statistics are well above 10. In our second-stage results in 
columns 1 to 4 of Table 3.16, we can see that the inflow of immigrants of other races has a 
significantly negative impact of the likelihood of volunteering, consistent with our previous 
finding that racial diversity leads to lower social capital investment. However, the inflow of own-
race immigrants also leads to a statistically significant reduction in the likelihood of U.S.-born 
individuals volunteering. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that the costs of 
generating social capital for U.S.-born people are higher when you interact with foreign-born 
individuals, beyond the simple racial composition of the community. Columns 5 to 8 also show a 
negative relationship between an increase in the proportion of foreign-born individuals, both own 
race and other races, and the number of hours volunteered by U.S.-born individuals, but this is 




not statistically significant as before. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Although previous authors have found that community heterogeneity (based on racial 
segmentation) leads to lower social capital investment, research on immigration has also shown 
that immigrants are different from local residents in terms of several observable and unobservable 
characteristics such as education and age. If we assume that these unobservable differences 
between U.S. citizens and foreign-born individuals lead to higher relational costs between the 
two (see Charles and Kline 2006), the increase in the proportion of the latter group in the 
community reduces social capital investment by the former. Based on this assumption, the main 
contribution of this paper to social capital and immigration research is to demonstrate a link 
between social capital investment and the proportion of foreign-born individuals in a community. 
Another contribution of this paper is that we used a novel dataset, the CPS September sample, 
between 2005 and 2011 in order to show that individual- and household-level characteristics 
affect volunteering in the same way as other proxies for social capital do. Noticeably, our 
individual-level results are consistent with previous research that has used trust or organizational 
membership as proxies of social capital investment. In particular, we found that volunteering 
increases with income and education, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
volunteering and age, peaking for individuals aged 40 to 44 years, while women are more likely 
and minorities are less likely to volunteer. Therefore, individuals’ volunteering behavior is 
consistent with social capital theory as well as the previously presented evidence. Our OLS 
results at the state level show that a 10% increase in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in 
a state leads to a 0.4 percentage point reduction in people volunteering, consistent with the 




individual-level results, a 0.7–0.8 percentage point decrease in the probability of volunteering. 
Our final contribution is to confirm the findings of Charles and Kline (2006) that the 
community heterogeneity–social capital investment relation is causal. If individuals that have 
higher social capital decide to live in more homogeneous communities, the relationship between 
community heterogeneity and social capital is biased towards zero. In our case, if states where 
U.S.-born individuals invest more in social capital are also states where recent immigrants decide 
to move (e.g., because people in their network see an increase in their social capital, which is 
more likely to help immigrants find jobs), then our estimates are biased towards zero. We thus 
used a SPIV, standard in the immigration literature, to distribute recent immigrants across U.S. 
states according to the 2000 pattern. As expected, our IV results are larger in magnitude than our 
OLS results at the state level and show that a 10% increase in the proportion of foreign-born 
people in a state leads to a 5–6 percentage point reduction in the proportion of individuals 
volunteering, consistent with our individual-level results. As before, the relationship between 
hours volunteered and the proportion of foreign-born individuals is also negative but not 
statistically significant. 
The presented research has important implications for public policy, particularly the current 
round of immigration reforms in the U.S.. Foreigners can migrate to the U.S. through two distinct 
pathways: (i) by using the family reunification scheme or (ii) following a request by a company 
for high-skilled individuals. However, these pathways are exclusive. Skill is not taken into 
consideration in the former and family relations with residents in the U.S. are not considered in 
the latter. 
This study finds that social capital (and therefore relationships with individuals in the U.S.) 
should be taken into consideration in both migration pathways in order to reduce the economic 




impact of immigration in receiving communities, as immigrants are less likely to change the 
composition of the receiving community (assuming that family members have similar 
characteristics). In this regard, a better scheme would be a points-based scheme such as those 
used in Canada and Australia, which allocates points for the different attributes of immigrants 
(e.g., family relations with residents in the destination country and skills), which could reduce the 
impact of immigration on social capital investment. Future research could thus focus on the 
optimal number of points offered for these skills- and relationship-based categories. 
  




Table 3.1 Activities 
 Coach, referee, or supervise sports teams 
Tutor or teach 
Mentor youth 
Be an usher, greeter, or minister 
Collect, prepare, distribute, or serve food 
Collect, make, or distribute clothing, crafts, or goods other than food 
Fundraise or sell items to raise money 
Provide counseling, medical care, fire/EMS, or protective services 
Provide general office services 
Provide professional or management assistance including serving on a board or committee 
Engage in music, performance, or other artistic activities 
Engage in general labor; supply transportation for people 
List of activities in which individuals engage: reported by the CPS. 
  





Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Sample 
 Obs Mean SD 
 Social capital    
 Membership of institutions 270727 3.55% 0.231 
 Volunteering 270727 3.01% 0.171 
 Hours volunteered 10030 2.105 15.5 
 Individual characteristics    
 Full-time workers 270727 61.02% 0.4877 
 Hourly income 25610 11.18 6.17 
 Women 270727 49.40% 0.49996 
 Married 270727 50.66% 0.5 
 Children 270727 30.20% 0.459 
 Age 270727 39.97 14.21 
 Education    
 Graduated high school 270727 33.22% 0.471 
 Other college 270727 19.04% 0.393 
 College degree or more 270727 30.63% 0.461 
 Race    
 White non-Hispanic 270727 68.42% 0.465 
 Hispanic 270727 12.58% 0.332 
 Black 270727 10.70% 0.309 
 Asian 270727 4.67% 0.211 
 Other 270727 3.63% 0.187 
 Household characteristics    
 Household income 252602 107.95 347.09 
 Household size 252602 1.631 0.803 
 State characteristics    
 U.S.-born 357 2969513 2861027 
 Foreign-born 357 542744 1107366 
 New immigrants 357 10753 65201 
 Gini 357 0.266 0.034 
 Racial fragmentation 357 0.383 0.161 
 MSA characteristics    
 U.S.-born 1099 599829 1053119 
 Foreign-born 1099 145304 485848 
 New immigrants 1099 2854 38103 
 Gini 1044 0.199 0.098 
 Racial fragmentation 1099 0.377 0.177 
Basic statistics for individuals aged 16–60 in the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. For hours volunteered, we 
restricted our sample to people that had reported volunteering in the past year. Information on mean hourly wage was conditional on 
reporting a positive amount. We have several missing values for hourly income because the CPS September sample is not as 
thorough at collecting information about wages as the March sample. Household, state, and MSA characteristics were calculated by 









Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics for Sample Who Reported Volunteering  
 Obs Mean SD 
 Individual characteristics    
 Full-time workers 10030 63.13% 0.4825 
 Hourly income 759 13.01 6.72 
 Women 10030 63.26% 0.482 
 Married 10030 63.57% 0.481 
 Children 10030 61.78% 0.486 
 Age 10030 39.24 11.78 
 Education    
 Graduated high school 10030 25.51% 0.436 
 Other college 10030 20.42% 0.403 
 College degree or more 10030 44.29% 0.497 
 Race    
 White non-Hispanic 10030 73.57% 0.441 
 Hispanic 10030 9.78% 0.297 
 Black 10030 9.50% 0.293 
 Asian 10030 3.09% 0.173 
 Other 10030 4.06% 0.197 
 Household characteristics    
 Household income 9688 145.47 411.72 
 Household size 9688 1.626 0.766 
Basic statistics for individuals aged 16–60 in the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011 that reported volunteering. 
Information on mean hourly wage was conditional on reporting a positive amount. We have several missing values for hourly 
income because the CPS September sample is not as thorough at collecting information about wages as the March sample. 










Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for Sample Who are Foreign Born 
 Obs Mean SD 
 Share of immigrants  15.68% 0.364 
 Social capital    
 Membership of institutions 56790 2.34% 0.175 
 Volunteering 56790 1.88% 0.136 
 Hours volunteered 1065 1.787 8.13 
 Individual characteristics    
 Full-time workers 56790 63.43% 0.4816 
 Hourly income 4155 10.22 5.69 
 Women 56790 50.42% 0.49999 
 Married 56790 63.04% 0.483 
 Children 56790 42.79% 0.495 
 Age 56790 39.54 12.67 
 Education    
 Graduated high school 56790 26.31% 0.44 
 Other college 56790 11.92% 0.324 
 College degree or more 56790 31.08% 0.463 
 Race    
 White non-Hispanic 56790 21.06% 0.408 
 Hispanic 56790 45.29% 0.498 
 Black 56790 8.04% 0.272 
 Asian 56790 22.50% 0.418 
 Other 56790 3.11% 0.174 
 Household characteristics    
 Household income 36075 116.05 372.29 
 Household size 36075 1.958 0.974 
Basic statistics for individuals aged 16–60 in the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011 that are foreign-born. 
Information on mean hourly wage was conditional on reporting a positive amount. We have several missing values for hourly 
income because the CPS September sample is not as thorough at collecting information about wages as the March sample. 










Table 3.5 OLS Regression of Volunteering at the MSA Level 
  Volunteering rate Ln total volunteer hours 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Change in proportion of 0.019 0.019 -2.299 -2.458 
foreign-born people (0.027) (0.031) (2.124) (2.254) 
 Lagged number of 0.0028 -0.0025 0.498 0.3901 
U.S.-born people (0.0051) (0.0103) (0.544) (0.578) 
 Lagged number of 0.00095+ 0.00082 -0.0302 -0.032 
foreign-born people (0.00049) (0.00055) (0.0498) (0.062) 
 MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Number of MSAs 157 157 157 157 
 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 MSA characteristics No Yes No Yes 
 Observations 1099 1044 1099 1044 
 R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06 
Relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals and changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals 
that live in each of the 157 MSAs between 2005 and 2011. Data are from the CPS September sample. Columns 1 and 2 show the 
volunteer rate in MSAs, while columns 3 and 4 show the log of total hours volunteered in MSAs. Columns 2 and 4 include 
controls for MSA characteristics such as inequality (Gini coefficient) and racial fragmentation. The differences in sample size are 
because of missing values in MSA characteristics. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; 










Table 3.6 OLS Regression of Volunteering at the State Level 
  Volunteering rate Ln total volunteer hours 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Change in proportion of -0.031 -0.039 -22.164 -23.644 
foreign-born people (0.038) (0.046) (18.2398) (17.933) 
 Lagged number of 0.048* 0.049* -9.577 -9.503 
U.S.-born people (0.021) (0.021) (6.478) (6.657) 
 Lagged number of 0.00015 -0.000066 -1.617 -1.596 
foreign-born people (0.00301) (0.0032) (1.426) (1.493) 
 State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Number of states 51 51 51 51 
 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 State characteristics No Yes No Yes 
 Observations 357 357 357 357 
 R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.18 
 Relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals and changes in the proportion of foreign-born 
individuals that live in each of the 50 U.S. states and Washington DC. between 2005 and 2011. Data are from the CPS September 
sample. Columns 1 and 2 show the volunteer rate in U.S. states, while columns 3 and 4 show the log of total hours volunteered in 
U.S. states. Columns 2 and 4 include controls for state characteristics such as inequality (Gini coefficient) and racial 
fragmentation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
  




Table 3.7 IV Regression of Volunteering at the State Level 
 Second stage 
  Volunteering rate Ln total volunteer hours 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Change in proportion of -0.532* -0.566* -73.312 -76.785 
 foreign-born people (0.219) (0.234) (81.645) (86.806) 
 Lagged number of 0.101** 0.109** 1.086 1.547 
 U.S.-born people (0.034) (0.037) (12.694) (13.71) 
 Lagged number of -0.021* -0.022* -3.935 -4.012 
 foreign-born people (0.00897) (0.0093) (3.337) (3.472) 
 State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Number of states 51 51 51 51 
 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 State characteristics No Yes No Yes 
 Observations 357 357 357 357 
  First stage 
 SPIV 1.015** 0.934** 1.015** 0.934** 
 (0.277) (0.257) (0.277) (0.257) 
 F-test 13.47 13.25 13.47 13.25 
The second stage (upper section) and first stage (lower section) of the IV regression on the relationship between social capital 
investment by U.S.-born individuals and changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals that live in each of the 50 U.S. 
states and Washington DC. between 2005 and 2011. Data are from the CPS September sample. The IV for changes in the 
proportion of foreign-born individuals is a SPIV. Columns 1 and 2 show the volunteer rate in U.S. states, while columns 3 and 4 
show the log of total hours volunteered in U.S. states. Columns 2 and 4 include controls for state characteristics such as inequality 
(Gini coefficient) and racial fragmentation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 










Table 3.8 OLS Regression for Volunteering by U.S.-born Individuals (1) 
 Dummy for volunteering Ln of volunteer hours 
 (1) (2) 
 Log hourly income 0.0076* 0.0032+ 
 (0.0029) (0.0019) 
 Missing income 0.014* 0.00603 
 (0.0069) (0.0043) 
 Full-time worker -0.0036** -0.00085 
 (0.00069) (0.00057) 
 High school graduate 0.0054** 0.0018** 
 (0.00084) (0.00054) 
 Other college 0.015** 0.0059** 
 (0.0012) (0.00074) 
 College degree or more 0.026** 0.0079** 
 (0.0015) (0.00088) 
 State fixed effects Yes Yes 
 Number of states 51 51 
 Year dummies Yes Yes 
 Race dummies Yes Yes 
 Observations 270727 270727 
 R-squared 0.03 0.00 
Relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and individual characteristics (income and 
education) in a specification similar to Glaeser et al. (2002). Data are from the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. In 
column 1, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for volunteering or not and in column 2, the dependent variable is the log 
of total hours volunteered by each individual. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 









Table 3.9 OLS Regression for Volunteering by U.S.-born Individuals (2) 
 Dummy for volunteering Ln of volunteer hours 
 (1) (2) 
 Aged between 20 and 24 0.012** 0.0043** 
 (0.00102) (0.0012) 
 Aged between 25 and 29 0.011** 0.0048* 
 (0.0021) (0.0022) 
 Aged between 30 and 34 0.0062* -0.0046 
 (0.0028) (0.0036) 
 Aged between 35 and 39 0.00032 -0.0031 
 (0.0035) (0.0047) 
 Aged between 40 and 44 -0.0027 -0.0017 
 (0.0054) (0.0059) 
 Aged between 45 and 49 -0.00396 -0.00082 
 (0.0061) (0.0069) 
 Aged between 50 and 54 -0.00089 -0.0037 
 (0.0068) (0.0081) 
 Aged between 55 and 60 -0.0029 -0.0026 
 (0.00795) (0.0096) 
 Birth year 0.00044+ 0.0000028 
 (0.00022) (0.00024) 
 State fixed effects Yes Yes 
 Number of states 51 51 
 Year dummies Yes Yes 
 Race dummies Yes Yes 
 Observations 270727 270727 
 R-squared 0.03 0.00 
Relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and individual characteristics in a 
specification similar to Glaeser et al. (2002). Data are from the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. In column 1, the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable for volunteering or not and in column 2, the dependent variable is the log of total hours 











Table 3.10 OLS Regression for Volunteering by U.S.-born Individuals (3) 
 Dummy for volunteering Ln of volunteer hours 
 (1) (2) 
 Dummy for women 0.013** 0.0043** 
 (0.00076) (0.00045) 
 Dummy for 0.0024** 0.00083 
being married (0.000698) (0.00068) 
 Child 0–2 years of age -0.0014 0.000042 
 (0.0016) (0.0011) 
 Child 3–5 years of age 0.018** 0.0033** 
 (0.0018) (0.000999) 
 Child 6–13 years of age 0.052** 0.013** 
 (0.00196) (0.0011) 
 Child 14–17 years of age 0.011** 0.0049** 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) 
 State fixed effects Yes Yes 
 Number of states 51 51 
 Year dummies Yes Yes 
 Race dummies Yes Yes 
 Observations 270727 270727 
 R-squared 0.03 0.00 
Part 3 of the relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and individual characteristics in 
a specification similar to Glaeser et al. (2002). Data are from the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. In column 1, 
the dependent variable is a dummy variable for volunteering or not and in column 2, the dependent variable is the log of total 
hours volunteered by each individual. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 








Table 3.11 OLS Regression for Volunteering by U.S.-born Individuals (4) 
 Dummy for volunteering Ln of volunteer hours 
 (1) (2) 
 Household size -0.0102** -0.0033** 
 (0.00055) (0.00031) 
 Household income 0.0000088** 0.0000031 
 (0.0000016) (0.0000019) 
 Household income -0.0000000026** -0.0000000011+ 
 square (0.0000000006) (0.0000000007) 
 Gini coefficient -0.024 -0.032* 
 (0.016) (0.015) 
 Racial -0.0075 0.024 
 fragmentation (0.0203) (0.024) 
 State fixed effects Yes Yes 
 Number of states 51 51 
 Year dummies Yes Yes 
 Race dummies Yes Yes 
 Observations 270727 270727 
 R-squared 0.03 0.00 
Relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and household and state characteristics in a 
specification similar to Glaeser et al. (2002). Data are from the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. In column 1, the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable for volunteering or not and in column 2, the dependent variable is the log of total hours 









Table 3.12 OLS Regression of Dummy for Volunteering with Immigration 
 
Dummy for volunteering Ln of volunteer hours 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Change in proportion of  -0.068+ -0.073+ -0.072+ -0.083* -0.0075 -0.0088 -0.0088 -0.025 
foreign-born people (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) 




U.S.-born people (0.021) (0.021) (0.0204) (0.0202) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Lagged number of -0.0028 -0.0032 -0.0035 -0.0038 -0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0036 -0.0041 
foreign-born people (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0034) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of states 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Race dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Household controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
State controls No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 
R-squared 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in the state. Data are from the CPS 
September sample between 2005 and 2011. In columns 1 to 4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for volunteering or not and in columns 5 to 8, the dependent variable is 








Table 3.13 IV Regression of Dummy for Volunteering with Immigration 
  Second stage 
  Dummy for volunteering Ln of volunteer hours 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Change in proportion of  -0.393** -0.454** -0.465** -0.518** -0.116 -0.131 -0.135 -0.161 
foreign-born people (0.111) (0.109) (0.109) (0.121) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.113) 
Lagged number of  0.0801** 0.083** 0.082** 0.0897** 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.018 
U.S.-born people (0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0192) (0.0205) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Lagged number of -0.016** -0.018** -0.019** -0.021** -0.0078+ -0.0084+ -0.0087+ -0.0094+ 
foreign-born people (0.0051) (0.00499) (0.00499) (0.0054) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.005002) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of states 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Race dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Household controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
State controls No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 
  First stage 
SPIV 0.908** 0.908** 0.908** 0.818** 
    
  (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0057) 
    
F-test 22096.82 22078.99 20078.99 20423.27 
    
Second stage (upper section) and first stage (lower section) of an IV regression on the relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and 
changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in the state. Data are from the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. In columns 1 to 4, the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable for volunteering or not and in columns 5 to 8, the dependent variable is the log of total hours volunteered by each individual. The IV for changes in the proportion 
of foreign-born individuals that live in the state is a SPIV. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.




Table 3.14 OLS Regression of Dummy for Volunteering with Immigration by Race 
 
Dummy for volunteering Ln of volunteer hours 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Change in proportion of -0.037 -0.038 -0.035 -0.0402 0.038 0.024 0.039 0.029 
foreign-born people (0.0303) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.037) (0.031) (0.032) 
Change in proportion of own 0.0096 0.00901 0.0058 0.0058 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 
race foreign-born people (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Lagged number of own 0.0012* -0.00026 0.00038 0.00038 0.00016 0.00036 0.00057 0.00058 
race U.S.-born people (0.00046) (0.00069) (0.00069) (0.000695) (0.00029) (0.00056) (0.00055) (0.00055) 
Lagged number of own -0.00027 -0.00038 -0.00043 -0.00042 -0.00033+ 0.000119 0.000055 0.000069 
race foreign-born people (0.00035) (0.00032) (0.00033) (0.00034) (0.000195) (0.00025) (0.00023) (0.00023) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of states 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Race dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Household controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
State controls No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 
R-squared 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in the state. The proportion of 
foreign-born individuals is divided into individuals of the same race and individuals of other races. Data are from the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. In columns 1 
to 4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for volunteering or not and in columns 5 to 8, the dependent variable is the log of total hours volunteered by each individual. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%




Table 3.15 IV Regression of Dummy for Volunteering with Immigration by Race (First Stage) 
  First stage 
  Change in proportion of foreign-born people Change in proportion of own race foreign-born people 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
SPIV  0.944** 0.954** 0.954** 0.851** 0.089** 0.286** 0.286** 0.289** 
other races (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0073) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
SPIV 0.012** 0.010002** 0.010002** 0.0068** 0.124** 0.103** 0.103** 0.102** 
own race (0.00098) (0.000997) (0.000997) (0.00094) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of states 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Race dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Household controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
State controls No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 
F-test 7491.08 7550.66 7551.15 6736.97 1680.62 1246.7 1247.1 1244.84 
First stage of an IV regression on the relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60, and changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals 
in the state. The proportion of foreign-born individuals is divided into individuals of the same race and individuals of other races. Data are from the CPS September sample between 
2005 and 2011. The IV for changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals that live in the state is a SPIV. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * 








Table 3.16 IV Regression of Dummy for Volunteering with Immigration by Race (Second Stage) 
  Second stage 
  Dummy for volunteering Ln of volunteer hours 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Change in proportion of  -0.328** -0.376** -0.381** -0.4296** -0.135 -0.1398 -0.142 -0.174 
foreign-born people (0.123) (0.128) (0.128) (0.143) (0.113) (0.119) (0.119) (0.133) 
Change in proportion of own -0.237* -0.252+ -0.247+ -0.254+ -0.115 -0.1004 -0.099 -0.102 
race foreign-born people (0.119) (0.148) (0.147) (0.146) (0.109) (0.137) (0.137) (0.136) 
Lagged number of own 0.0029** 0.0039 0.0045+ 0.0046+ 0.00091 0.0018 0.00202 0.0021 
race U.S.-born people (0.00078) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.00072) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Lagged number of own -0.0024* -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0018+ -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0016 
race foreign-born people (0.0012) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0011) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of states 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Race dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Household controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
State controls No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 
Second stage of an IV regression on the relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and changes in the proportion of foreign-born 
individuals in the state. The proportion of foreign-born individuals is divided into individuals of the same race and individuals of other races. Data are from the CPS September 
sample between 2005 and 2011. In columns 1 to 4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for volunteering or not and in columns 5 to 8, the dependent variable is the log of 
total hours volunteered by each individual. The IV for changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals that live in the state is a SPIV. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + 
significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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